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ABSTRACT 
The struggle between development and conservation remains salient with today’s 
focus on global climate change.  This conflict is seen most clearly in the Brazilian 
Amazon.  International, developed nations advocate conservation, while developing 
nations fight for progress.  Conservationists expect international organizations, developed 
nations, and domestic grassroots organizations to pressure the Brazilian government in 
conserving the Amazon.  Development advocates point to the need to stabilize Brazil’s 
economy and expand into the Amazon for its untapped resources.  To understand the 
impasse between these two forces, one must look to a third actor: the Brazilian military.  
This thesis examines the critical role of the military in Amazonian policy.  Guaranteeing 
Brazil’s borders and national security, the military views its infiltration of the Amazon as 
part of its mission.  It also sees development and population increase as tools the 
government must use to increase sovereignty over the Amazon.  This thesis concludes 
that the military and its concerns must be addressed before development policy in the 
Amazon can incorporate conservation.  The Amazon must be conserved as a global 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE AMAZON: DOMESTIC RESOURCE WITH GLOBAL IMPACT 
As the world’s largest rainforest and representing 54 percent of Brazil’s territory, 
the Amazon is a highly visible stage on which international and domestic actors 
converge.1  The United States and other “northern governments” have increased their 
awareness of environmental concerns since the 1970s and now fund projects in the 
Amazon to promote sustainable development.2  Beginning with the Rio Summit in 1992 
and continuing now with growing awareness of climate change, the international 
community has pressed for reduced deforestation and protection of the Amazon.3  
Brazilians, on the other hand, see the Amazon as an untapped region open to exploration, 
conservation and development: a “ticket to the country of the future.”4  Brazil is a rapidly 
developing country that seeks to use its resources to advance domestic prosperity and 
international reputation.  Faced with “new technologies, population growth, and the 
extension of new settlements into areas once largely unpopulated,” Brazil’s policies in 
the Amazon have global implications.5  In order to form effective partnerships with this 
developing power, its views must be considered.  How Brazilians characterize concepts 
like sovereignty, national security, conservation and development are important to 
understand in order to foster understanding on issues ranging from drug trafficking to 
environmental protection.   
Since the transition to democracy in 1985, Amazonian policy has vacillated 
between conservation and development, despite steady international environmental 
 
1 Eliane Alves da Silva, “Cartography and Remote Sensing in the Amazon: The SIVAM Project” 
(paper presented at ISPRS Symposium on GIS, Stuttgart, Germany, 1998), 580. 
2 Kathryn Hochstetler and Margaret E. Keck, Greening Brazil: Environmental Activism in State and 
Society (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 2-5. 
3 Margaret E. Keck, “Amazônia in Environmental Politics,” in Environment and Security in the 
Amazon Basin, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Heather A. Golding (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson 
International Center of Scholars, 2002), 31. 
4 Hochstetler and Keck, 142. 
5 Jorge I. Domínguez et al., "Boundary Disputes in Latin America," Peaceworks 50 (August 2003): 9. 
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pressure.  Presidential policies, governing styles and interactions with various actors in 
the Amazon explain this puzzle.  Brazilian presidents are often compelled to support 
development and increase economic growth; however they also react to international 
conservation pressures.  The fate of the Amazon cannot merely be characterized as a 
battle between these domestic development goals and international conservation efforts.  
Instead, the variety of actors that affect presidential strategy in the Amazon—
conservationists, developers and security forces—must be considered. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL LITERATURE 
The environmental literature largely evaluates presidential policies through the 
lens of international pressures and norms.  It seeks to explain theoretical models in which 
international actors can affect domestic social movements.  When the developed North 
proposes these conservation policies, the developing South is often wary of implementing 
those measures.6  The simplistic understanding of the conservation debate—between 
international and domestic interests—is good to identify relevant policy forces, but it 
does not fully capture the gradation of development and conservation actors in the 
Amazon.  Keck and Sikkink explain how domestic environmentalists use international 
connections to pressure state governments into action.7  According to Keck and Sikkink, 
the government interacts with international funding institutions for development and 
reacts to local conservation activists to periodically develop policy in the Amazon.  While 
the work delineates international actors like non-governmental organizations and 
international funding institutions, the Brazilian government is still treated as a monolithic 
entity.  This focus on international actors is prevalent in environmental literature, but 
overlooks the important distinctions of domestic conservation actors.  
In 2007, Kathryn Hochstetler and Margaret Keck produced a seminal work on 
domestic environmentalism in Brazil.  They analyzed the Brazilian environmental 
 
6 Simon Dalby, “Threats from the South? Geopolitics, Equity, and Environmental Security,” in 
Contested Grounds: Security and Conflict in the New Environmental Politics, ed. Daniel H. Deudney and 
Richard A. Matthew (Albany: State University of New York Press), 167. 
7 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
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movement according to formal and informal institutions, processes and personal network 
connections.  They observe that various levels of government—local, state and federal—
either “block” or “enable” progress for environmental change.8  While Hochstetler and 
Keck discuss the personal influences and networks of Brazil’s environmental ministers, 
they surprisingly leave out discussion of key decision makers like the president.  Adding 
depth to environmental literature, Hochstetler and Keck conclude that “transnational and 
domestic actors and processes have been heavily intertwined in Brazilian environmental 
politics, to the point where neither can be understood without the other and often the two 
cannot even be distinguished.”9  This explanation accounts for international actors, 
domestic activists and Brazilian democracy, but largely ignores the role the executive 
plays in shaping policy and the varied face of development in the Amazon.10   
Development is often described as cooperation between private business and the 
state that methodically extracts resources and products from a given area and contributes 
to national economic growth.  For example, soybean farmers on the large plains of Mato 
Grasso are registered landowners who pay taxes and export soybeans that account for 
29% of world soybean production.11  This organized, efficient system does not pervade 
the Amazon.  Illegal mining and logging account for the most destructive type of 
development that enrages environmental activists.  Landless farmers also invade the 
region for subsistence farming.  None of these extractive practices benefit the country’s 
economy.  In fact, these illegal activities detract from government-supported projects for 
developing the Amazon.  They produce insecurity and competition with legally-
recognized developers in the region.  The lawlessness that these illegal developers bring 
to the region creates one of many security issues in Amazônia.  Presidents must consider  
 
8 Hochstetler and Keck, 228. 
9 Ibid., 230. 
10 Presidents are mentioned fewer times than prominent environmental ministers.  The military is not 
listed at all as an actor.  Ibid., Index. 
11 Agriculture Report, "2003 Soybean Production in Brazil," U.S. Meat Export Federation, 
http://www.usmef.org/Misc_News/International_Market/03_Brazil_SoyBeanReport.pdf (accessed March 
2, 2009). 
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the impact of this illegal development on legal landowners, exports and national 
prosperity.  Distinction between development actors is crucial for understanding how a 
president approaches development in the Amazon. 
Violent clashes between legal and illegal developers, fights between indigenous 
peoples and developers, and the long, porous border are all security issues that shape 
conservation and development in the Amazon.  The range of security forces—federal 
police, militarized police and state police to name a few—in the Amazon are numerous, 
but often under-manned, under-resourced and beholden to a variety of local and state 
bureaucracies.  The Brazilian military, as a federal security actor, assumes the role as 
primary security actor in the Amazon.  It often performs police functions along the 
border.  Apart from mitigating domestic clashes between development actors, the military 
is also charged with protecting the border against incursions from drug-traffickers and 
guerillas activity that spills over from neighboring countries.  In this lightly populated 
area that abuts five other nations, the military is a representative of state power and 
sometimes enforces conservation laws, such as bans on logging.12 This intermingling of 
domestic security, law enforcement and protection of international sovereignty makes 
Amazonian “security” and the military’s involvement a complex issue that has been 
ignored by the environmental literature. 
With ideas and missions for development, expansion into and control of the 
Amazon developed during the military regime, the military remains a powerful actor.  
For presidents, the military is a built-in security force that controls lawless actors and aids 
with government development projects.  However, the military’s concepts of national 
security and sovereignty can create tension with international actors and presidential 
conservation policies.  The military reacts strongly against international actors that 
violate Brazil’s sovereignty.  Since indigenous reserves create pockets of land that are 
off-limits to the military, the military takes great umbrage with this conservation 
measure: “the head of the Army’s Amazon command derided the “federal government’s 
 
12 Wendy Hunter, State and Soldier in Latin America: Redefining the Military’s Role in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 23. 
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indigenous policy as ‘regretful and chaotic.’ ”13  Presidents can leverage the military as a 
security force, but must account for its strong security preferences in the Amazon. 
C. PRESIDENTIAL GRAND STRATEGY 
This thesis offers an alternate explanation for environmental policy changes in the 
Brazilian Amazon.  It focuses on presidential decisions and how those policies drive 
actors in the region.  While the concept of grand strategy was applied by Jorge I. 
Domínguez to discuss border disputes in Latin America, this concept also explains the 
complicated world of Amazonian policy.  Domínguez refines grand strategy as “a foreign 
policy designed to identify how specific policies can enhance a country’s ability to 
mobilize internal and external resources to promote its security and prosperity.”14  
Considering all of the national levers of power—diplomatic, economic, military and 
political—Brazil is highlighted as the first Latin American country to have a grand 
strategy, beginning in the early twentieth century.15  He also notes that grand strategies’ 
outcomes vary depending on what type of development policy is sought: short-term, 
long-term, economic or social.16  This analysis places the responsibility for Amazonian 
policy squarely with the president.  Only he is in a position to balance the various actors 
in the Amazon to compliment his overall objectives.  Presidents enter office with goals to 
restore economic stability, maintain power and often depend on a variety of actors to 
accomplish these ends.17 
Presidential grand strategy encompasses civil-military relations, governing style 
and complicated balancing of diplomatic, political, military and economic considerations 
to achieve a fundamental vision.  Based on a president’s overall goal for Brazil—
 
13 Michael Astor, “Brazil’s courts, military question Amazon policy,” Boston Globe, August 4, 2008, 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2008/08/04/brazils_courts_military_question_amazon_
policy/ (accessed September 30, 2008). 
14 David Mares, “Boundary Disputes in the Western Hemisphere: Analyzing Their Relationship to 
Democratic Stability, Economic Integration, and Social Welfare,” Pensamiento propio 14 (July-December 
2001): 31-59 as quoted in Jorge I. Domínguez et al., "Boundary Disputes in Latin America," Peaceworks 
50 (August 2003): 33. 
15 Jorge I. Domínguez et al., 33. 
16 Ibid., 34. 
17 Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 5 (January 1994): 65. 
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economic prosperity, social equality, or world recognition to cite a few—grand strategies 
come in many forms.  This variety of strategies determines how presidents interact with 
conservation, development and security actors. It also allows for the differing outcomes 
that one sees in Amazonian policy.  The civil-military relations debate is subsumed by 
this grand strategy approach because presidents must contend with more than the military 
when considering actors that influence national policy.  Brazilian presidents fall into two 
general categories with this model: those with a grand strategy and those without a grand 
strategy.  For presidents with grand strategies, they use the military’s established security 
concerns and institutional capacity to contribute to their larger development goals in the 
Amazon.  For presidents thrust unexpectedly into office without a grand strategy, they 
react to exogenous forces and often look to the military for support of their policies. 
There are three reasons why a presidential “grand strategy” approach is better 
than the existing environmental literature in explaining policy outcomes in the Amazon.  
The first is that presidents must consider strategic, security issues that range from 
securing their borders, dealing with the military, and remaining powerful compared to 
their neighbors.  The second is that presidents are not as constrained by electoral factors 
as legislative politicians.  During election cycles, successful presidents form coalitions 
and appeal to a broad sector of society.  Once popular mandate is won, presidents have 
the rest of their term to enact preferred policies without danger of losing their position 
(unless criminal charges are brought against them).  Presidents are not bound to the same 
short-term, region-specific electoral concerns as legislators because the entire country is 
their constituency.  Finally, presidents must weigh international actors and reactions 
when formulating domestic policy.  To increase Brazil’s international prestige, presidents 
must appeal to the international community norms and leverage that influence 
domestically.   
Using grand strategy analysis and drawing from existing civil-military relations 
literature, this thesis creates a richer understanding of how presidents use grand strategy 
to leverage the military in the environmentally-sensitive region of the Amazon.  Wendy 
Hunter asserts that politicians exercise control over the military when they have electoral 
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incentives—sacrificing military interests to their constituencies.18  Jorge Zaverucha 
counters that the military has its own prerogatives and power that must be contested 
before civilians can exert control.19  Borrowing from Zaverucha’s analysis, the grand 
strategy analysis recognizes the military as a powerful actor with strong preferences in 
areas like the Amazon.  Presidents must contend with a strong military and account for its 
views when formulating their grand strategies.  However, presidents also have incentive 
to incorporate the military when its preferences coincide with his grand strategy.  
Strategic presidents balance political incentives to institute civilian control of the military 
and the military’s preferences when formulating their grand strategies for the Amazon. 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter II establishes military preferences and historic roles in the Amazon—as 
they developed during the military regime—before presenting the extreme contrasts 
between Brazil’s first three president.  Both José Sarney (1985-1989) and Itamar Franco 
(1992-1994) assumed power in the wake of unexpected crises and did not have grand 
strategies to guide their terms in officer.  Sarney inherited office with the “untimely death 
of President-elect Tancredo Neves” in 1985.20  Franco, Collor’s Vice President, took 
office subsequent to Collor’s impeachment.  As presidents dealing with economic 
instability and lacking domestic political support, both Sarney and Franco looked to the 
military for political support.21  This dependence on the armed forces and lack of 
strategic vision for the Amazon translated into presidential support of existing military 
prerogatives in the Amazon.  Development was controlled by the military and precluded 
conservation in the Amazon under Sarney and Franco.  However, this preference for 
military-led development was punctuated by President Fernando Collor. 
 
18 Wendy Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1997). 
19 Jorge Zaverucha, Frágil democracia: Collor, Itamar, FHC e os militares (1990-1998) (Rio de 
Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2000), 28. 
20 Kurt Weyland, “The Growing Sustainability of Brazil’s Low-Quality Democracy,” in The Third 
Wave of Democratization in Latin America, ed. Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 90. 
21 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 43-48.  
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Contrary to the presidents that preceded and followed him, Fernand Collor de 
Mello (1990-1992) had a grand strategy for neo-liberal reform that shaped his Amazonian 
policies.  With lack of legislative and military support for his economic reforms, he 
depended on international loans and prestige to enforce his strategy.  Collor used 
conservation-minded international actors as his power base and deliberately chose to 
enact policies in the Amazon to bolster their support.  He did not react to a crisis, as 
Sarney and Franco did, but proactively strengthens the environmental movement.  
However, his incomplete presidency—cut short by corruption charges—leaves the 
question of whether he successfully subdued the military with his conservation policies or 
if they were left as guardians of the Amazon.   
Chapter III outlines the pragmatic and coalitional grand strategy the Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) employed in the Amazon.  Reacting against the 
dictatorial governing style of Collor and the two lame duck presidents, Cardoso 
maintained a balance between development, conservation and security elements in the 
Amazon.  Domestic support for his economic plan allowed him to pursue a grand strategy 
of solidifying Brazil’s economy and consolidating democratic institutions.  In forming his 
strategy, Cardoso was cognizant of the strong military prerogatives in the Amazon, as 
both a developer and security force.  He used these views to further his grand strategy 
and effectively instituted civilian control of the military at the same time.  His diverse 
record of security, development and conservation policies in the Amazon attests to 
Cardoso’s long-term grand strategy.  Chapter IV highlights how President Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva (2003-present) continued the coalition-based, pragmatic approach to the 
presidency.  He kept some aspects of Cardoso’s economic development, but made social 
inclusion the goal of his grand strategy.  His balance of development, conservation and 
security are still being played out as he completes his second term.  Chapter V concludes 
with recommendations for U.S. policy-makers when engaging with Brazil on multi-
faceted Amazonian policies. 
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II. EXECUTIVE EXTREMES: AMAZON POLICY UNDER 
SARNEY, COLLOR DE MELLO, AND FRANCO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Brazil’s transition to democracy occurred in 1985, but the success of the first 
three presidents varied wildly.  Grand strategy, when employed, enables presidents to set 
policy and manipulate actors to achieve their policy objectives.  This chapter examines 
how grand strategy was used or ignored by Brazil’s first three presidents.  Conservation, 
development and security in the Amazon are three primary considerations when 
formulating a Brazilian grand strategy.  To provide context for the Amazon’s security 
dimension, the military’s legacy is discussed first.  The armed forces’ perceptions of 
national security and sovereignty are important considerations for formulating a grand 
strategy that affects the military.  Finally, the administrations and grand strategies for 
José Sarney, Fernando Collor de Mello and Itamar Franco are evaluated with respect to 
their Amazonian policies.   
B. THE MILITARY 
The Brazilian military, particularly the army, has historically played an important 
role in the Amazon: establishing the country’s borders and defending its sovereignty.  As 
one of Brazil’s early, capable state actors, the military was charged with pressing into the 
interior of the nation to establish its sovereignty.  In the Amazon, a region that abuts five 
of Brazil’s neighbors, the military was especially concerned with border security and 
protecting sovereignty.22  In order to reach and protect the far borders of Amazônia, it 
was necessary to develop roads and military bases along the way.  For the military, an 
implicit connection between development and securing the Amazon was formed.23  This 
 
22 World Factbook Reference Maps, “South America,” CIA World Factbook, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/reference_maps/south_america.html (accessed 
December 10, 2008). 
23 Paulo Cesar Miranda de Azevedo, “Security of the Brazilian Amazon Area” (Individual Study 
Project, U.S. Army War College, 1992).   
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mission—to protect Brazil’s borders and sovereignty in the Amazon using 
development—has remained consistent despite the growing tide of concern for 
conservation.  According to the military, pressure from the international conservation 
community and the preservation of indigenous reservations conflict with development 
projects and, therefore, maintaining sovereignty.  These strong views have been molded 
throughout Brazil’s history and represent possible tension between civilian policies and 
military practices, especially in Amazônia. 
1. History of the Military’s Presence in the Amazon 
From its independence in 1822, the military remained closely attuned to the 
changes in Brazilian government.  The unique transition from a colony to a monarchy 
was met with little military resistance, a small army contingent in Grão Pará offering 
token resistance in the Amazon.24  The military was deployed to the front during the 
southern boundary wars—including the War of the Triple Alliance—from 1852 to the 
early 1870s and emerged triumphant in protecting Brazilian interests.25  These victories 
resulted in a technically proficient army that saw themselves as the only capable 
defenders of Brazil, thereby creating a tension with civilian leaders.26  This tension 
manifested itself when the military stepped in to abolish the monarchy and create the 
Brazilian Republic on November 16, 1889.27  The army prized its role as guardians of the 
state and a military officer, Hermes de Fonseca, was elected as the first president in 1910 
with a penchant for military modernization.28  During the 19th century and after Brazil’s 
border disputes were largely settled, the military saw itself take on the mantel of internal 
security and looked to the Amazon for expansion.29  However, this internal focus was not  
 
 
24 Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), 38. 
25 Skidmore and Smith, 150-151. 
26 Loveman, 51-52. 
27 Skidmore and Smith, 154. 
28 Loveman, 92-93. 
29 Ibid., 93. 
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limited to military exploits in the jungle.  After General Fonseca’s intervention, the 
federal army felt it had to save Brazil from ineffective politicians, a motif that would be 
repeated in the mid-twentieth century. 
The military entrenched its role as political guardians, economic developers, and 
guarantors of national defense during the first half of the 20th century.  The military 
leader turned politician, Getúlio Vargas, retooled the Constitution in 1934 to expand 
presidential powers and established the Estado Nôvo in 1937.30  Vargas’ mission to exert 
control over Brazil’s vast, federal system affected the military as well.  He used the army 
to expand economic development in the country’s interior.  Expansion and modernization 
of the military ranks before World War II meant that a cohesive, federal army had 
resources to expand into the Amazon as a public works actor.31  Since the state was 
primarily concerned with industrialization to the south—to combat shortages caused by 
the Great Depression and World War II—the military was left to oversee states’ 
development projects in the Amazon.32  Rubber production had been a primary Brazilian 
export to the U.S., especially during WWII, but did not produce enough revenue to attract 
industrialists to the Amazon.33  Falling rubber prices near the end of the war and a 
declining national economy led to monetary shortages and tumultuous politics.  The 
military, fearful of political upheaval, chose to step in and depose Vargas in late 1945 and 
allow free elections.34  The military emerged from the Depression and WWII with two 
important ideas based on their roles in the Amazon and with the federal government: 
internal security meant tutelage of civilian government and economic development could 
only succeed with military guidance.  These ideas were pursued in earnest during the 
Second Republic and the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. 
 
30 Loveman, 95.  “Estado Nôvo” is the “New State” and lasted until the late 1940s. 
31 Ibid., 96. 
32 Skidmore and Smith, 159. 
33 Luis Bitencourt, “The Importance of the Amazon Basin Region in Brazil’s Evolving Security 
Agenda,” in Environment and Security in the Amazon Basin, ed. Joseph S. Tulchin and Heather A. Golding 
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2002), 58. 
34 Skidmore and Smith, 172. 
 12
                                                
Under the Second Republic, 1946 to 1964, the Brazilian military’s doctrines of 
internal security, development and sovereignty remained untouched by the embroiled 
civilian government.  A series of presidents passed through the executive—challenged by 
economic crises, IMF limitations and political coalition collapses.  The army recognized 
that successive presidents faced economic turmoil, but was content to maintain its 
tutelage of civilian government, at first.35  In an attempt to help the flagging economy, 
the military turned its attention to the Amazon.  The army began a “geopolitical 
maneuver” to connect the far-reaching states of Brazil through infrastructure construction 
and settlement facilitation.36  It was believed that if the Amazon’s resources could be 
marshaled, Brazil’s economic crisis would end.  The breadth of populating and 
developing the Amazon required a level of coordination and resources that only the army 
could muster.  Developing and settling Amazon states were projects that directly 
increased sovereign control over territory and guaranteed national security along Brazil’s 
borders, both explicit military missions.  For awhile, the military was content to focus on 
development as a panacea for Brazil’s economic and political troubles. 
In 1964, the political corruption and ineptitude was too much for the military to 
bear.  As Guardians of Brazil, the military felt compelled to step in and take over the 
country.  Conditioned by a highly cohesive education system, military elites saw the 
crumbling economy, “the demands of the Left for a constituent assembly, and the 
growing indiscipline of the enlisted men as signs that Brazil was entering a stage of 
subversive warfare.”37  The military regime began in 1964, dominated by the army, and 
attempted to instill military efficiency into the government.  However, the military’s 
foray into political power did not result in a wholesale militarization of the Amazon.  
Instead, the authoritarian regime was as constrained by limited resources as previous 
civilian governments.38  The military even tabled its own modernization and acquisition 
 
35 Skidmore and Smith, 174-181. 
36 Azevedo, 31-34. 
37 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in 
Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1973), 58. 
38 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 102-103. 
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goals to focus on the economic woes of the nation caused by an ever-worsening import 
substitution industrialization (ISI) economic model.39  Although it was predominantly 
focused on politically and economically rehabilitating the state, the Brazilian armed 
forces incrementally expanded into the Amazon.  
In the late 1960s, the Amazon infrastructure projects originally begun in the late 
1950s restarted under the guise of national security: “integrate so as not to 
disintegrate.”40  Seeing the region as filled with subversives, illegal miners and criminals, 
the military justified development projects as a way to increase their presence in the 
region and maintain security.  The regime began the Polamazônia project in 1975 to 
industrialize areas of the Amazon, further develop rubber resources and exploit mineral 
riches; which disregarded environmental concerns and attracted international censure.41  
The military also took over nuclear program efforts from Itamaraty (the Brazilian Foreign 
Service) and pursued extensive mining efforts in the Amazon to supply the needed 
minerals.42  Control of the nuclear program, spearheaded by the Navy, was a prerogative 
that the military retained even after the transition to democracy.  In its final years, the 
mid-1980s, the military regime was focused on maintaining its prerogatives while 
creating political opening and a gradual transition back to civilian power.  The mining, 
road-building and development projects in the Amazon were put on hold while the 
military carefully handed the reigns of power 
The transition to civilian rule in 1985 allowed the military to resume its traditional 
role as protectors of the nation and guarantors of national security, freed from the burden 
of having to run the government during a time of economic crisis.  However, instead of 
retreating to the barracks, the military used their influence during the transition to 
safeguard a wide range of military prerogatives.  Some of the prominent prerogatives 
included separate ministers for each service; well-developed professional rules that 
 
39 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 104. 
40 Bitencourt, 58.  National Security phrase was: integar para não desintegrar. 
41 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 120.  
42 Michael Barletta, “The Military Nuclear Program in Brazil” (paper presented at CISAC, Stanford 
University, August 1997), 4-9.  
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guaranteed individual branch unity (army, air force and navy) and common 
understanding of national security; control over the intelligence apparatus; and 
maintenance of a nuclear program.43  These prerogatives were not inviolate, but they 
formed the basis for future civil-military contestation.  In the Amazon, the military had 
established itself as a capable development actor.  Since the return to democracy in 1985, 
civilian presidents have either clashed with the military or utilized it as a key 
development actor in the Amazon.   
2. Sovereignty and National Security 
The military holds particular views on national security and sovereignty as they 
exist in the Amazon region.  The Brazilian understanding of national security is a nexus 
of maintaining internal order, securing borders and countering external threats.  With 
difficult terrain and vast reaches of border to secure, the army views national security as 
critical in this region.44  Three dominant threats to national security are criminal 
elements, indigenous reserves and international interests.  Narco-traffickers, illegal 
miners and neighboring guerillas are all seen as criminal threats to internal order and 
secure borders.45  Indigenous reserve demarcations create land disputes between 
Brazilians and represent an affront to the army’s ability to enforce internal order.  The 
proximity of several reserves to international borders also challenges the army’s mission 
of securing borders—particularly the Yanomami reserve near the Venezuelan border.46  
The last broad attack on sovereignty is intense interest of the “First World” or 
international environmental community in the Amazon.47  These three national security 
threats challenge Brazil’s sovereignty in the Amazon, according to the military.  
 
43 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 36-40. 
44 Bitencourt, 61.   
45 Ugor Gungor, “Impacts of Prolonged Peace on Brazilian Politics” (Master’s .Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005), 34-35.  
46 Sergio José Pereira, “Amazon, priority for Brazilian National Defense Policy” (Strategy Research 
Project, U.S. Army War College, 2000), 7.   
47 Pedro Aramis de Lima Arruda, “Brazilian Rain Forest: Security, Environment, Development” 
(Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 1993), 13-15.   
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The military—and its views on national security and sovereignty—are firmly 
entrenched as Brazil’s main development actor and state presence in the Amazon.  
Presidential grand strategies dictate whether the executive will challenge or incorporate 
this significant actor.  Since the military has a history as the primary development actor in 
the region, it is more likely to agree with federal policies of settlement, mineral extraction 
and other non-conservation policies.  The connection between sovereignty and an 
occupied Amazon—the military’s ability to exert control over the region—is also well 
established.  These developed areas contribute to the nation’s economic prosperity and to 
maintaining control over its sovereignty: “the oc[c]upation of the Amazon is an inherent 
obligation of Brazil to achieve its national objectives, strengthen national integration, and 
continue progress and peace.”48  Presidents must account for a strong, possessive military 
in the Amazon when formulating their grand strategies.   
C. JOSÉ SARNEY: 1985 - 1989 
The transition from João B. Figueiredo, who presided over the final six years of 
the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, to civilian rule was supposed to be orderly and pre-
determined.  Tancredo de Almeida Neves was the leader of the opposition party and had 
been chosen—through the electoral college—as the first democratic president.49  Neves’ 
untimely death left José Sarney, a member of the military’s government party, as the first 
democratic president in Brazil since 1964.  Since Sarney had not planned to be president, 
he did not have a grand strategy with which to rule the country.  He was also constrained 
by a still-dominant military that successfully guarded its prerogatives during the long, 
gradual transition to democracy.  Sarney’s lack of grand strategy forced him to deal with 
political issues as they arose.  Economic issues, a looming military that maintained its 
power and the need to facilitate a new constitution were all forces that Sarney could not 
control.  As his presidency progressed and the economy declined, he had less control over 
the country’s progress.  He grew more dependent on the military for support.50  Sarney’s 
 
48 Pinheiro, 8. 
49 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 40. 
50 Ibid., 43. 
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presidency was overshadowed by extensive military prerogatives and a series of failed 
economic plans, forcing him to react to crisis instead of capitalize on it. 
A series of economic woes plagued President Sarney’s throughout his time in 
office.  He inherited failing ISI system from the military regime.  Labor strikes, in the 
mid-to-late 1980s, presented protracted economic crisis in the industrialized regions that 
forced him to focus his economic efforts to the south.51  Since the development focus was 
south and the army leadership was pre-occupied with maintaining its prerogatives, 
lawlessness pervaded the Amazon.  The region, especially Rondônia, offered exploitable 
land that was populated without governmental regulation and, therefore, did not 
significantly improve the country’s economic situation.52  Landless peasants concerned 
with subsistence farming formed a large part of this expanding, disorderly frontier.  
However, neither Sarney nor the military were as concerned with frontier expansion in 
the Amazon as they were with political issues in the capital.  Sarney’s initial economic 
package—the Cruzado Plan—was weak from the beginning, but utterly failed in 
December 1986.  In the wake of this failure, he lost public support and faced daunting 
military institutions.  These limitations forced him to rely on the military for political 
strength after 1986.53   
As a conservative politician, President Sarney was not prepared to attempt the 
neo-liberal reforms that were needed to salvage Brazil’s economy.  Since the military 
regime depended on the ISI model and state-run industry, conservative and military 
elements were against neo-liberal reforms that included privatization.  To avoid economic 
issues, Sarney focused attention on drafting a new, civilian constitution.  He announced 
the creation of a National Constituent Assembly (ANC) to draft a new constitution in 
May 1986.54  Sarney declared that the new congress—composed largely of conservative 
politicians who were beholden to the military and could be influenced by him—would 
 
51 Wendy Hunter, “Politicians Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthoritarian Brazil,” 
Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): 431-434. 
52 Hochstetler and Keck, 146-147. 
53 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 12. 
54 ANC is the acronym for Assembléia Nacional Constituinte. Ibid., 43. 
 17
                                                
serve as the ANC.55  The military also sent a large delegation to the ANC to ensure that 
its interests were maintained.  As a result of the controlled transition to democracy, the 
military had maintained significant power and numerous prerogatives.  As Zaverucha 
discusses, the armed forces had at least fifteen enumerated privileges within the 
government.  Control of the federal military police; separate military courts; autonomous 
promotion structure (even for generals); ability to sell military land without congressional 
oversight; and direct participation in the military-industrial complex were some of the 
critical prerogatives the military sought to protect during the ANC.56  During the next 
two years of intense debate, meetings and drafts of the constitution, the military 
maintained a strong lobby in the ANC to defend these remnants of the authoritarian 
regime. 
Sarney’s lack of grand strategy prevented him from having specific, articulated 
views on development, conservation or security.  Instead, he was “focused on the short-
term goal of political survival.”57  This weakness left actors to pursue their projects in the 
Amazon.  The military immediately initiated plans for Calha Norte—a development 
project to build bases and roads along the northern Brazilian border—after the transition 
to democracy.  Once plans for this mobilization of a large number of troops in the 
Amazon were finalized within the military, Calha Norte was presented to Sarney for 
approval.  The president duly authorized extensive land grants in the northern Amazon to 
facilitate this army-led expansion into the Amazon.  Sarney’s support for the project was 
not reflective of his personal beliefs on development.  Instead, it ensured the military 
would continue to support his tenuous political position.  In the face of continued 
economic decline, Sarney was politically shortsighted and did not have specific intentions 
for the military’s project in the Amazon.  The military, however, had very definite 
objectives for Calha Norte. 
The military’s definite views of national security and sovereignty both contributed 
to their vision of Calha Norte.  One aspect of this garrisoning of the Amazon with bases 
 
55 Hunter, Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, 43. 
56 Jorge Zaverucha, Frágil democracia: Collor, Itamar, FHC e os militares (1990-1998) (Rio de 
Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2000), 37. 
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was the external threat of political instability.  Both Suriname and Peru were security 
concerns along Brazil’s northern and western Amazon borders—in the form of political 
unrest and Sendero Luminoso’s guerilla warfare.58  The military also sought to bring 
order to development in the Amazon and control lawless frontier elements like landless 
peasants, illegal loggers and unauthorized miners.  Since the military still controlled the 
federal police, they provided internal security for the region.  This project fulfilled the 
army’s notion of maintaining Brazil’s sovereignty and security in the Amazon.  
Construction of bases and roads to reach the border also contributed to the military’s 
development capacity.  Each of these roles was established under the military regime.  
Calha Norte—born of the military’s attempt to maintain those functions—was not an 
expansion of the armed forces into uncharted territory, but an exercise of their 
prerogatives.  Sarney’s backing for Calha Norte was not manifestation of a particular 
presidential policy in the Amazon.  Instead, it was a short-term solution for maintaining 
military support.  The project kept its momentum until an internationally-recognized 
crisis forced Sarney to support conservation efforts and inhibit military development in 
the Amazon. 
The sudden death of Francisco “Chico” Mendes in December 1988 catalyzed the 
international environmental community and pressed Sarney to adopt limited conservation 
policies.  Chico Mendes was a rubber-tapper, indigenous rights advocate, and active 
leader in the Worker’s Party (PT) who traveled abroad extensively to advocate 
indigenous livelihoods (like rubber-tapping, nut harvesting and fishing) in the Amazon.59  
When this famous conservationist was murdered, the international outcry was 
tremendous, even if domestic indignation was minimal.60  Sarney’s lack of grand strategy 
meant that he responded immediately to the crisis by appeasing the international 
community with a flurry of conservation efforts—ignoring domestic actors’ views.  In 
short order, a reserve along the Brazil-Venezuela border was created for the Yanomami 
 
58 Michael B. Ryan, “Calha Norte: Explaining the Brazilian Army Presence in the Amazon” (Master’s 
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Indians.61  In 1989, he created a new government environmental institution, IBAMA, and 
solicited the UN to host the “Earth Summit.”62  International interest in the Amazon, 
piqued by Mendes’ death, was sustained by incredible rates of deforestation and plagued 
Sarney’s last full year as president.  These measures and appeasement of the international 
community reflect the complete lack of Sarney’s strategy for dealing with different 
Amazonian actors and issues.  His support for the development-focused Calha Norte and 
reliance on the military for political strength was divergent from his conservation efforts 
and focus on international approval.  Sarney did not try to reconcile these two forces—
conservationists and the military—because his remaining time in office was so short.  
The lack of popular support for environmental conservation, combined with 
Sarney’s own political weakness, meant the president had to find legal basis for this 
headlong shift in policy focus.  He used the ratified constitution as a basis for these 
urgent environmental decisions.  The newly minted constitution, signed into force on 
October 5, 1988, actually contained a provision “designating the Amazon as a national 
patrimony and requiring that its environment be preserved.”63  The extensive nature of 
the constitution is one reason why this language survived conservative and military 
scrutiny.  The other reason is that the military, with its intact prerogatives and ongoing 
Calha Norte program, felt that its role as primary actor in the Amazon was secure.  The 
potential conflict between military development and conservationist reserves was not 
played out during the president’s last months in office.  Instead, Sarney’s non-existent 
strategy and combination of divergent policies resulted in unresolved tension between the 
military and conservationists in Amazônia. 
D. FERNANDO COLLOR DE MELLO: 1990-1992 
President Fernando Afonso Collor de Mello was the first publicly elected 
president in more than 25 years.  Creating a new political party for the election, he 
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narrowly won in the second round against Lula da Silva, the Worker’s Party candidate.64  
His campaign was based on anti-established parties, military-run intelligence institutions 
like SNI and SADEN, and distancing himself from Sarney’s economic policies.65  
Collor’s main objective was to carry out neo-liberal economic reform.  Therefore, he 
developed a grand strategy for dealing with domestic and international actors based on 
that objective.  Although anti-military rhetoric—specifically against SNI—was 
prominent during his campaign, it did not represent a specific agenda for establishing 
civilian control of the military.  He also did not have specific conservation goals until 
after he took office.  The narrow campaign victory combined with his PRN capturing 
only seven percent of votes in congress meant that Collor had very limited domestic 
support for his grand strategy to economically reform Brazil.66  These domestic 
limitations forced him to look to the international community to support his grand 
strategy. 
As a neo-liberal reformer, Collor faced both intense pressure and interesting 
challenges in pursuing his economic-oriented grand strategy.  State-owned enterprises 
were notoriously inefficient, but efforts to privatize them met with social resistance—
from the military and workers who had stake in the ISI system.  This societal resistance 
compounded the legislative resistance (large number of disparate political parties) that 
Collor had to overcome.67  The military was another contentious domestic actor.  During 
the regime, military government embraced ISI and was a supporter of state-owned 
enterprises.  This legacy made them natural opponents to Collor’s plan to privatize and 
open the economy to international competition.  Of the different options to institute 
reforms, in spite of domestic resistance, Collor chose to look for international recognition 
and rule with presidential decrees.  Across Latin America, neo-liberal reformers relied 
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heavily on the international community for loans and foreign direct investment to affect 
their economic transitions, but Brazil had something especially tangible to offer the 
international community: the Amazon.  Since international attention was still focused on 
Amazonian deforestation, Collor leveraged that interest with conservation programs that 
bought him foreign support.  He knew that the military, a key actor in the region, was 
opposed to his international-based plans in the Amazon.  To block the military from 
interfering with his grand, neo-liberal strategy and efforts in the Amazon, he needed to 
simultaneously assert control over the military.  Collor recognized the important actors 
that could aid or inhibit his grand strategy of economic reform.  In the face of dismal 
domestic support, he used the Amazon and conservation as a bargaining tool to secure 
international backing for his neo-liberal plans. 
Collor believed that Amazônia should “pay for itself” and support his grand 
strategy of liberalizing the nation’s economy.68  Appealing to international 
conservationist convictions, he instituted debt-for-nature swaps that allowed international 
actors to purchase Brazil’s foreign debt in exchange for parcels of land that would then 
be granted to local environmental NGO’s.69  With Decree 22—issued on April 22, 
1991—Collor began extensive demarcation of indigenous reserves beginning with the 
Yanomami Indian Reserve.70  Creation of indigenous reserves gained Collor 
international support from investors concerned with human rights and rainforest 
preservation.  These appeals to increase international involvement in the Amazon were 
direct affronts to military views of sovereignty.  In response to these executive policies, 
the army general in command of the Amazon “threatened to ‘transform the Amazon into 
a new Vietnam’ if developed countries continued to ‘internationalize’ the region.”71  The 
general who voiced this opposition to the press was quickly replaced: General Antenor de 
 
68 Nigel J.H. Smith et al., “Amazonia,” in Regions at risk: Comparisons of threatened environments, 
ed. Jeanne X. Kasperson et al., (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1995), 60.    
69 Ibid., 131. 
70 Zaverucha, Frágil democracia, 69.  
71 Donald E. Schultz, The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future (Carlisle, 
Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00028.pdf (accessed December 14, 2008), 28. 
 22
                                                
Santa Cruz Abreu was relieved by General Carlos Annibal Pacheco.72  The swift reaction 
to this declamation of international involvement in conservation policies was important to 
establish clear control over the military.  Whether they agreed with presidential policies 
of indigenous reserve creation or debt-for-nature swaps, the military chose not to publicly 
criticize conservation programs for the remainder of Collor’s administration.  Brief 
reprimand and removal of one general officer was not enough to change some of the 
military’s ingrained perceptions of the Amazon. This tangential control of the military 
was incurred when the armed forces threatened international support of Collor’s 
conservation program.   
President Collor effectively stifled the military from publicly contradicting his 
conservation programs for the next two years, but he received more international 
attention from two other measures designed to curb military projects.  Since the military 
was opposed to neo-liberal projects in general and privatization of land in the Amazon in 
particular, Collor’s economic plans required circumventing the military.  He took several 
steps to realize this goal.   First, he “announced his decision to demilitarize the Calha 
Norte project” on March 22, 1990.73  Collor cut the military’s Amazon development 
project as a way to diminish their impact on the Amazon.  International conservation 
groups saw the northern development project as environmentally harmful and 
contributing to deforestation rates.  Since military-controlled land in Amazônia neither 
contributed to neo-liberal reforms nor helped Brazil’s international image, the Calha 
Norte program was cut.  Collor continued to seek international approval with his de-
militarization of the nuclear program.  Starting on November 28, 1990 and concluding in 
1991 with the Guadalajara Accord, he looked to former rival, Argentina, and pursued 
nuclear security cooperation in order to undermine Brazil’s strongly institutionalized 
military.74  President Collor’s primary incentives were fostering economic growth 
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through neo-liberal reform, currying favor with international backers and remaining in 
power.  Undermining the military’s autonomous, development power in the Amazon 
region was important to gain foreign allies that funded his economic reform grand 
strategy. 
The clearest example of this power shift was Collor’s establishment of the 
extensive Yanomami reserve on the border with Venezuela, just one year after he cut 
funding for Calha Norte development.  In preparation for the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, 
creating indigenous reserves kept Brazilian conservation visible to international actors.  
Collor did not worry about undermining the military’s vision of border security and 
sovereignty in the Amazon.  Instead, his presidential conservation support fostered the 
growth of local environmental activism in Brazil and created stronger civilian 
institutions.  Preparations for the Río Summit (UNCED) in 1992 forced disparate and 
disorganized NGOs to unite and define Brazilian conservation.75  His final act to improve 
Brazil’s conservation image was appointing internationally-renowned environmental 
activist, José Lutzenberger, as his Environmental Secretary.76  All of these conservation 
actions were used to bolster international financial support for Collor’s economic 
reforms.  Early actions to limit military influence in the Amazon cleared the way for him 
to focus on the Rio Summit and increasing international support for his presidency. 
These machinations of environmental politics for economic gain under President 
Collor were cut short by impeachment hearings that began on October 2, 1992 and 
concluded on December 29, 1992.77  The potential diplomatic advantages and political 
capital garnered by the Río Summit went unrealized as Collor faced corruption charges.78  
It is difficult to predict whether Collor’s multiple methods to minimize the military would 
have advanced civilian control of the military or resulted in a challenge to his authority.  
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Nonetheless, it is clear to see that President was the first president to have a grand 
strategy that he pursued by manipulating domestic and international actors.  Since he was 
domestically weak, he chose to use conservation as a platform to gain international 
funding and legitimacy.  This grand strategy appeared effective in bolstering domestic 
conservation efforts at the expense of military development, but its long-term 
effectiveness cannot be evaluated.  Collor’s corruption scandal and ensuing impeachment 
created the chaotic rise of Brazil’s third democratic president.   
E. ITAMAR FRANCO: 1993 - 1995 
Itamar Franco, Collor’s vice president, came to power as an interim president.  He 
was sworn in by the National Congress on December 29, 1992 and then won the 1993 
election in the second round.79  The rapid accent to power left precluded him from 
forming a grand strategy for ruling Brazil.  His connections with the Collor regime and 
the corruption scandal handicapped his presidency’s credibility.  Franco did not have the 
charisma or drive to appeal to the international community and continue Collor’s version 
of neo-liberal reforms.  Instead, this caretaker president “tried to strike a balance between 
permitting the military to expand their mission in Amazônia and keeping international 
criticism at bay.”80  The corruption scandal eclipsed any international support connected 
with the Rio Summit, and Franco was forced to rely on domestic actors to carry out 
policy.  Collor failed to implement any lasting neo-liberal reforms during his short tenure, 
so Franco was also left with an economy in crisis.  “Persistent inflation, combined with 
severe recession,” marked the first two years of Franco’s term.81  Reacting to this 
domestic crisis, Franco announced a war on poverty that used the military to reluctantly 
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“distribute food and provide health services” in urban areas.82  The military was one of 
Franco’s primary actors because it was organized, disciplined and had presence 
throughout the country.  As a reactionary president lacking a grand strategy, Franco did 
not establish a system of balancing important actors against each other to achieve any 
clear policy objectives.  For two years, Franco tried various economic policies and 
attempted to guarantee the military’s support with a new development project in the 
Amazon.   
The military, while disinherited by Collor, learned that conservation ideas were 
gaining popularity in Brazil.  To remain an important actor in the Amazon, the military 
had to adjust its development programs from outright environmentally destructive 
programs to environmentally aware efforts.  The military understood that projects with 
both conservation and development aspects would be more difficult to halt than purely 
military development like Calha Norte.  As soon as Franco was elected, military 
commanders proposed an Amazon protection system that centered on sustainable 
development: Sistema de Proteção da Amazônia (SIPAM).  The proposal was both lofty 
and all-encompassing: 
The [official] goals for SIPAM…include environmental protection, 
supervision of occupation and use of soil, prevention and disease control, 
protection of Indian lands, and identification of punishable legal activities 
(such as drug trafficking, weapons smuggling, and the invasion of borders 
and Indian settlements).83 
SIPAM was meant to protect the Amazon in terms of conservation, internal security 
(protection of Indian lands) and sovereignty (invasion of borders).  Conservation was 
added to the military’s accepted roles of security and sovereignty.  This change in 
rhetoric was probably driven by domestic popularity of environmentalism leading up to 
the Rio Summit.  However, adopting “environmental protection” and “protection of 
Indian lands” did not contradict the military’s mandate to protect Brazil’s sovereignty.  
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The SIPAM system was proposed to keep conservation efforts in the hands of Brazilians 
and avoid “internationalization of the Amazon.”84  This independent program, invented 
by the military to solidify its long-term role in the region, reasserted the military’s 
importance in the Amazon. 
SIPAM was conceived as a doctrine to control the Amazon, but it needed 
technical mechanisms to achieve its lofty goals.  The Sistema de Vigilância da Amazônia 
(SIVAM) was the supportive system of radars and communication stations that would 
“extend state control and supervision” over the Amazon.85  In addition to SIPAMs 
objectives, SIVAM was advertised as a way to regulate air traffic, detect illegal 
extraction (deforestation and mining) and deter drug-trafficking in the Amazon.86  Franco 
agreed to military recommendations and implemented an eight-year development 
program costing US$600 to US$800 million in 1993.87  His decision was not the result of 
balanced consideration of domestic and international tension over the Amazon’s future, 
as Hunter asserts.  Franco’s lack of grand strategy meant that he had no policy 
justification for weighing domestic and international opinions on the Amazon.  Instead, 
he supported SIPAM/SIVAM to appease the military’s saber-rattling over low budgets 
and salaries.88  Franco had no grander ambitions for the Amazon.  He was a reactive, 
politically weak president who depended on the military for stability and compensated it 
with a new program to control the Amazon.   
Franco’s continuous pursuit of economic stability was finally realized under his 
finance minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.  Cardoso, who had served in the foreign 
ministry (Itamaraty), was an acclaimed scholar of development and advocate for neo-
liberal reform.  The economic package he developed for Franco worked so well that 
Cardoso garnered enough public acclaim to win the presidency in 1995.  Economic 
success in the final months of Franco’s presidency did not overshadow the absence of a 
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grand strategy.  President Franco’s short tenure was a litany of reaction to crisis, mostly 
economic.  He did not exercise control over the military, but appeased it with the 
SIPAM/SIVAM system.  His lack of grand vision for Brazil handicapped his ability to 
effectively balance domestic and international actors. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The military regime established a strong hold on the Amazon prior to the 
transition to democracy.  President Collor, with a coherent grand strategy, was able to 
contest the military’s dominion over the Amazon when it detracted from his larger 
economic goals.  Presidents Sarney and Franco took office without grand strategies and 
suffered.  They were also forced to rely on the military as a dominant actor in the 
Amazon. The dual transition to democracy and a free-market economy highlighted the 
numerous international and domestic actors that presidents must balance to carry out 
policy.  If a president is weak and lacks a grand strategy, he reacts to crises and does not 
leverage actors against each other to affect policy outcome.  Presidents who formulate a 
grand strategy are able to institute policies and balance actors to achieve their desired end 
state.  In Brazil, both types of presidents must contend with an established military 
presence that controls security and sovereignty in the Amazon.  They must also contend 
with international conservation elements that seek to preserve the region. The presence of 
a grand strategy determines how the president will leverage the actors in the Amazon and 
what type of policies he pursues.  
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III. STUDIED APPROACH TO AMAZON POLICY UNDER 
PRESIDENT CARDOSO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, more commonly known by his initials 
FHC, became President of Brazil ten years after the transition to democracy.  He entered 
office with a grand strategy to consolidate democracy.  The primary goals of his grand 
strategy were neo-liberal economic reform to promote growth; civilian control of the 
military; and increased international prestige.  He used coalitional-style rule for domestic 
goals and diplomacy abroad to achieve his goals.  As with any president, FHC faced a 
variety of actors and pre-existing prerogatives that he had to contend with to carry out his 
grand strategy.  Creation of the hallmarks of civilian control of the military—a National 
Defense Plan and a civilian Ministry of Defense—was crucial to consolidate democracy.  
To avoid military resistance to these plans, FHC had to concede to military prerogatives 
in the Amazon.  This required careful balancing of the military against international 
pressures, domestic conservationists and developers.  Cardoso accomplished his grand 
strategy in the course of two terms by implementing policies that both appeased and 
balanced a variety of actors. 
This chapter analyzes the actors and issues in the Amazon that President Cardoso 
had to contend with while carrying out his grand strategy.  First, the formulation and 
content of Cardoso’s grand strategy for Brazil will be discussed.  Then, the existing 
environmental policies will be explained before discussing the impact of the military’s 
SIVAM project on Cardoso’s initial strategy in the Amazon.  Next, Decree 1775 and its 
impact on a variety of domestic and international actors will be discussed.  The chapter 
will conclude with analysis of Cardoso’s two civil-military reforms: the National Defense 
Policy and the Ministry of Defense.  The goal of this chapter is to prove that application 
of a grand strategy to Cardoso’s presidency resulted in the successful balance of strategic 
actors in the Amazon.   
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B. FHC’S GRAND STRATEGY 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s early accomplishments were as a highly recognized 
academic who published numerous books on sociology and economic analysis.  
However, aspirations for tenure at University of São Paulo were interrupted by the 
military coup in 1964, and Cardoso fled first to Santiago, Chile and later to Paris, 
France.89  During his time in exile, FHC continued to write and published Dependency 
and Development in Latin America in 1969.  His academic interest in democracy and 
economic development continued—even after his return to Brazil during the military 
regime—when he helped to create the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Research 
(CEBRAP) in 1970.  This endeavor enabled him to create contacts with the American 
Ford Foundation while maintaining ties with academia in São Paulo.  Since the military 
regime prevented him from remaining in the university system, CEBRAP offered an 
alternative venue for him to continue work on dependency, urban issues, and democratic 
consolidation.90  Cardoso’s intensive academic background and focus on political issues 
were good foundations for his transition to political life as a senator in the opposition 
party under the military regime.    
As a senator, FHC continued to establish the groundwork of political strategy that 
later developed into his grand strategy.  He was active first in the Democratic Movement 
(MDB) and then transitioned easily to the centrist Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) 
after 1985.91  Participating in the National Constituent Assembly (Assembléia Nacional 
Constituinte or ANC) to rewrite the Constitution, FHC had his first official conflict with 
the military.  The initial draft, heavily influenced by Deputy Bernardo Cabral and FHC, 
limited domestic military roles to those “expressly” authorized by the civilian 
authorities.92  The military chafed at this strong wording and a compromise was reached 
that included both the military’s vision of self-determined internal roles and a modicum 
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of civilian control.93  The 1988 Constitution clearly established the President as 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and included detailed environmental language, 
but did not significantly change the military’s self-described role as defenders of the 
nation.  FHC had both made his personal preference for civilian control of the military 
known and achieved compromise with army lobbyists over the language in the 
Constitution.  These actions foreshadowed what he would later do as president: 
accommodate the military’s rhetoric to achieve the more important political victory.  
Emerging from the ANC as a recognized figure, he attempted to reform the 
PMDB from a patronage, catch-all party to a progressive party.  He failed to convince the 
leadership that change was necessary, so he formed his own party, the Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDB) in 1988.  In 1992, he transitioned from senator to minister and 
accepted a variety of postings in the Itamar Franco administration that culminated in his 
appointment as Minister of Finance in 1993.94  He was charged with implementing a 
policy that would curb hyperinflation and solve the economic crisis afflicting Brazil.  He 
developed the Plano Real: a combination of national fiscal austerity measures and state-
level budget accountability.95  The plan consolidated financial responsibility in the 
federal government and was introduced in February 1994, in conjunction with his 
candidacy for President.  Immediate reduction of inflation and an improvement in the 
national economy assured that “he won handily, even avoiding a second-round runoff.”96  
This popular support allowed him to pursue his strategic plan of democratic consolidation 
without much resistance from domestic actors. 
FHC did not rely on his presidential mandate—as Collor had done—but 
deliberately built coalitions with domestic actors.  Cardoso had to build support in 
congress for his economic reforms, civil-military policies, and efforts to amend the 
constitution (with a re-election clause).  While Collor was forced to issue decrees and 
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look to the international community to enforce policy, FHC appealed to domestic actors 
to carry out his grand strategy.  Inaugurated on January 1, 1995, FHC began his project of 
consolidating the government.  Although he issued 143 provisional presidential decrees 
“in the first three months of his administration alone” to enact short-term financial 
changes and agency reorganizations, he consulted extensively with Congress for long-
term economic reforms.97  He also used the military to break a national oil-workers’ 
strike in May 1995.98  Cardoso reached out to these key actors—congress and the 
military—early in his presidency while the tide of economic growth was still strong.  In 
addition to these critical domestic forces, FHC traveled abroad extensively to build 
Brazil’s reputation and encourage international investment.99  Well on his way to 
instituting the economic and international aspects of his grand strategy, he was forced 
engage with Amazonian issues before he could advance his civil-military aims. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
As a strategic president, President Cardoso had to deal with existing 
environmental actors while forging his own Amazon policies that supported his larger 
ambition.  His resulting environmental record was “mixed at best.”100  As an academic, 
he co-wrote Amazônia: Expansion of Capitalism with Geraldo Müller in 1977. This work 
analyzed the cycles of development in the Amazon that centered on the rubber boom of 
the late eighteenth century, but did not advocate particular development or 
conservationist policies.101  Indicative of his coalitional style, “Cardoso [was] not 
opposed to all economic development, but advocated a balanced and planned approach.  
Although the region had been opened up by [military] government policy, much of the 
life was lawless.”102  This early analysis became critical in FHCs later determination to 
control security in the region and establish controlled development in the Amazon.  
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Cardoso maintained concern for the Amazon during his tenure as a senator: supporting 
the Yanomami indigenous cause and creation of reserves mandated by the 1988 
constitution.103  He even highlighted his maternal connection to Amazonas during the 
1994 presidential election.104  FHC understood that he had to appeal to conservationist—
along with other actors in the Amazon—in order to even have the chance to affect change 
as president.  
Once in office, Cardoso’s minimized the indigenous conservation issues he 
previously supported.  He silently allowed many of the environmental programs of his 
predecessors continue—including Planafloro, Pilot Project for the Amazon (PPG-7), and 
Pronabio.105  Besides, these programs did not directly impact Cardoso’s grand strategy 
because they linked international funding to Brazilian NGOs through government 
bureaucracy, and barely involved the office of the president.  Instead, Cardoso had to 
grapple with the policies—sovereign indigenous reserves—he inherited from Collor.  
Demarcation of indigenous reserves was mandated by the 1988 constitution, but political 
support for demarcation was limited.  It impeded national development and did not have 
support from conservative politicians or the military.  In 1991, Collor used presidential 
Decree 22 to elevate indigenous land preservation over competing commercial, state and 
other interests.106  Local politicians, miners, loggers and cattle ranchers, regularly 
“opposed the restrictions that this legislation placed upon both development and the 
extraction of natural resources within indigenous areas.”107  The military also felt “Brazil 
was pressed by the international community to form indigenous nations,” that represented  
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potential threats to sovereignty.108  This mix of dissatisfaction with existing 
environmental policy would have to wait until FHC dealt directly with the military and 
gained their support. 
D. SIVAM PROJECT 
The military was wary of FHC with his reputation as a progressive academic.  In 
August 1995, shortly after President Cardoso’s first election, the military conducted 
extensive maneuvers in Amazônia to prove their extensive capability in the region.  
Operation Tarauaca was “‘the largest military operation ever held in Amazônia’—
involving six thousand troops from the army, navy, and air force on three fronts in the 
states of Acre and Amazonas.”109  Cooperation between traditionally independent and 
divergent military branches, this exercise was seen as an overt display of military power.  
The military meant to intimidate FHC into granting them de facto control of the Amazon.  
However, this position of strength was undermined when the Brazilian Air Force 
(FAB)—and one of Cardoso’s personal ministers—unintentionally created a scandal that 
FHC had to resolve.110 The Brazilian Air Force was the only organization that had 
maintained interest in the SIVAM program during the severe recession at the end of 
Franco’s presidency: even signing a contract with Raytheon Corporation to begin 
construction on SIVAM in 1994.111  The Raytheon contract did not immediately result in 
new equipment for the FAB, but became “the Cardoso administration’s first scandal” in 
November 1995.112  In order to avoid corruption allegations that would cripple his ability 
to carry out his grand strategy, FHC supported the Raytheon contract as both military 
modernization and as an environmental measure. 
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The larger, civilian SIPAM project was originally conceived under President 
Collor to coordinate state agencies and conservationist NGOs in the Amazon.113  SIVAM 
was the technical system of radars, aircraft and communication centers that would 
support SIPAM.  These initiatives were established in preparation for the 1992 Rio 
Summit, but were forgotten in the wake of Collor’s corruption scandal and impeachment 
proceedings.114  The SIPAM program was entrusted to the Secretariat for Strategic 
Affairs (SAE), while the SIVAM project was kept by the Brazilian Air Force (FAB)—
under the auspices of the Ministry of Space and Technology.115  Using SIVAM as 
justification, FAB autonomously entered into a contract with Raytheon to modernize their 
aircraft and build radar systems in the Amazon.  The Brazilian government was supposed 
to pay Raytheon 15 percent of the total cost, but the project was bankrolled by Raytheon 
Credit Facility Company instead.116  Construction was scheduled to start in 1994, but 
bureaucracy, economic crisis and impending elections all precluded joint U.S.-Brazilian 
radar construction in the Amazon.  The Raytheon scandal involved one of FHC advisors 
claiming that bribes had been paid to begin construction on SIVAM.  FHC distanced 
himself from the advisor, but also knew he had to support the military who had just 
demonstrated their prowess in the Amazon.  With pressure to appease the military and 
ensure their long-term support, he gave the FAB-initiated deal his presidential support 
and pushed for congressional support (funding). 
After avoiding fallout from the November 1995 Raytheon scandal, Cardoso 
needed to build support for the program in congress.  SIVAM was billed to congress and 
the public as a system to monitor the environment and standardize civilian air traffic 
control.  The funding for this military modernization program was passed in 1996, 
financially “restructured in 1997—and the letters of credit—which total US$1.4 billion—
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went into effect in July 1997.  In 1999, SIVAM acquired its first equipment and made its 
first installments in the region.”117  Not surprisingly, FHC announced his National 
Defense Policy shortly after funding for SIVAM was approved.  Three years later, when 
SIVAM installation began, the first civilian Minister of Defense was sworn in.  FHC 
transformed SIVAM from a liability at the outset of his presidency into a long-term 
project that bought military support when he needed to pass civil-military reforms.  
Cardoso pushed the project through the doldrums of the legislative process and past the 
“cloud of wrongdoing” when it benefited his strategy of instituting civilian control of the 
military.118   
FHCs explicit support for the military facet of an Amazon-protection system is 
not accidental.  The successful funding and implementation of SIVAM was mirrored by 
the “failure of SIPAM and migration of civilian coordination to Defense Ministry.”119  
SIPAM was supposed to be the overarching project to protect the Amazon, but took a 
back-seat to SIVAM construction.  Envisioned as a coalition of federal, state, and local 
government bodies that would liaison with international NGO’s, this idea competed with 
funding for a plethora of other Brazilian environmental agencies.120  Since the domestic 
environmental movement was not a cohesive actor that could sway votes or provide 
political support, SIPAM did not figure into Cardoso’s grand strategy.  The lack of 
backing meant that SIPAM received no Congressional funding.  International support for 
SIPAM was also non-existent, so SIVAM became the government’s primary Amazon 
policy under FHC.121  The elevation of a military-led project over a civilian-centric 
program is demonstrative of the influence the military held regarding Amazonian matters.  
Cardoso supported an embattled military contract to construct new radars, update aircraft 
and give the Brazilian Air Force a role in the Amazon.  The army maintained their 
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position as frontier defenders and primary land-owners and welcomed the FABs efforts to 
build a comprehensive communication system in the Amazon.  Therefore, construction of 
airstrips and military outposts—in support of SIVAM—contributed to both FHC and the 
military’s strategic mission of developing and occupying the region.   
After dealing with the SIVAM scandal, initially appeasing the military and setting 
it into congress’ hands, FHC returned his attention to balancing the conservationists and 
development factions in the Amazon in early 1996.  To undercut the indigenous reserve 
policies enacted by Collor and left untouched by Franco, he needed to relate the concept 
of “extractive reserves” to the preserves created under Decree 22.  Allowing for limited 
development in these areas would avoid internal political turmoil with Amazônia 
politicians and the military, who were both set on development.  The environmental 
community, specifically Mary Allegretti, had already linked the two ideas in 1992.122  In 
the wake of the Rio Summit, “extractive reserves” were meant to allow indigenous 
harvests and industry.  By early 1996, both Brazilian NGOs and IFIs involved with the 
PPG-7 project encouraged sustainable development like rubber tapping and indigenous 
harvesting as key activities within indigenous extractive reserves.123  Yet, Cardoso 
needed to either open these extractive reserves to development actors or minimize their 
size in order to maintain popular support.  Decree 1775 solved the problem of 
maintaining support for indigenous rights—as guaranteed by the constitution—and 
appealing to development interests.   
E. DECREE 1775 
In January 1996, President Cardoso issued Decree 1775 that allowed third parties 
to contest indigenous reserve demarcation.  It was advertised as “necessary to ensure the 
constitutionality of protecting indigenous people’s lands in the face of future 
development projects.”124  In actuality, it allowed development projects to proliferate on 
indigenous lands.  Since most reserves were still in the extensive process of registration 
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with FUNAI, developers and even state governments contested the boundaries and 
pressed farther into previously-designated indigenous areas.125  Brazilians also saw this 
decree as federal authorization to invade indigenous lands and begin mining, logging and 
ranching while interminable court proceedings were underway.126  FHC placed the onus 
of determining extractive rights and land ownership on the justice system, but the 
domestic and international backlash were focused on him.   
In line with his grand strategy of planned, balanced development in the Amazon, 
Cardoso attempted to focus international and environmental actors on the importance of 
sustainable development that Decree 1775 allowed.  He failed to successfully win over 
conservationists.  Environmentalists supported the concept of indigenous extractive 
reserves, but they did not condone invasion and decimation of legal indigenous lands.  
The assault on the Indigenous Area Raposa Serra do Sol (RSS) in Roraima was equated 
to the Yanomami plight under Sarney and earned international sympathies.  The World 
Wildlife Fund added to environmentalist pressure when they lobbied for a federal 
agreement to “conserve 10 percent of the Amazon forest” in 1997.127  FHC agreed to the 
WWFs proposal and was forced to issue another decree on December 11, 1998—after his 
re-election—that specifically demarked Macuxi land in RSS. 128  These two 
environmental concessions did not outweigh the political damage done to indigenous 
reserves by Decree 1775.  Nor did they outweigh FHCs support from domestic 
developers who continued to contest indigenous reservation boundaries in court.   
Cardoso lost some face with the international and environmental communities 
when he issued Decree 1775 in early 1996.  However, the pursuit of his strategic goals 
for development and civil-military control were more important than immediately 
winning back conservationist approval.  After successfully instilling a Ministry of 
Defense in 1999, he re-engaged with the environmental arena and appointed Mary 
Allegretti—an accomplished Brazilian environmentalist—as secretary for Amazônia in 
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the Ministry of the Environment in 1999.  She was charged with implementing the 
WWFs 10 percent proposal, with approval from state politicians.  Allegretti, not Cardoso, 
bargained with governors to enforce the 1965 Forest Code and agree on protection areas 
that would satisfy international environmentalists.129  Agreements on conservation areas 
reached between the Ministry of the Environment and individual governors would be 
forwarded to the national congress for approval.  Cardoso had successfully distanced 
himself from environmental criticism and mitigated the impact of that mistake on his 
grand strategy.   
While the international and domestic conservationists were outraged, the military 
was supportive of FHCs Decree 1775 because it enabled challenges of indigenous 
“sovereignty.”  The military’s perception of indigenous people and partitioned areas had 
to be considered when presidents approach Amazonian policy.  According to the army, 
indigenous people want to be included in national efforts to defend sovereignty and 
Brazilian national security.  The Batalhão de Infantaria de Selva (BIS) is the Jungle 
Infantry Battalion comprised of primarily indigenous soldiers that serves as the quick 
reaction force, in cooperation with the Brazilian Navy and FAB, for responding to illegal 
mining, drug interdictions, and possible FARC attacks.130  Natives fighting against those 
illegal elements—in defense of their individual reserves—challenges military authority in 
the Amazon.  The military believes that indigenous people should only defend their 
portion of the Amazon as part of a sanctioned military force; otherwise, they represent a 
threat to security.  These views echo efforts during the military regime to integrate 
indigenous peoples into the regular population.  FHC was shrewd in recognizing the 
military’s disapproval of indigenous reserves—on security grounds—and gained a 
modicum of support with his decree to limit that sovereignty.   
President Cardoso also realized the military’s fear of internationalization of the 
Amazon when he issued Decree 1775.  Creation of indigenous reserves as part of “the 
indigenous peoples project, despite being the result of negotiations between the 
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government, indigenous peoples, and advocacy organizations, remains unacceptable to 
many sectors within the government (namely, the military and the Ministry of External 
Affairs).”131  The military’s objection to indigenous reserves was longstanding fear of 
internationalization in the Amazon.  Some military analysts believed that these reserves 
“drew attention from the international community and enhanced its special vulnerability 
to foreign intervention.”132  As previously discussed, foreign involvement in the Amazon 
was seen as a breach of sovereignty.  Since these anxieties existed before FHC was 
elected, it was important for him to deal with the military’s disapproval of indigenous 
reserves before he could issue the National Defense Policy (PDN).  While influential 
Amazon politicians and developers clamored for this decree, it is important to realize that 
it provided FHC additional credibility with the military, one of the most powerful actors 
in the Amazon.  With the military’s support for his indigenous policy issued in January 
1996, Cardoso moved on to establishing the first hallmark of civilian control: the 
National Defense Policy. 
F. NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY (NOVEMBER 1996) 
To ensure lasting success of his first civil-military reform, Cardoso took a series 
of steps to ensure military backing of a National Defense Policy.  After appealing to legal 
developers and the military with Decree 1775 in January and advocating SIVAM before 
congress in mid-1996, he also proposed salary increases in March 1996.133  It is 
important to note that two of these appeasement measures dealt with the Amazon.  This 
demonstrates that FHC understood the military’s captivation with the region.  Only after 
he secured the military’s support was FHC ready to implement his first civil-military 
reform.  Almost two years after his inauguration on November 7, 1996, he fulfilled one of 
his campaign promises: to publish a national defense policy (PDN).134  Instead of 
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provoking the military, the PDN reaffirmed traditional military ideas of development and 
their presence in the Amazon.  However, as “the first document of its type since 1985, it 
was innovative only in its timidity.”135  The PDN framed development of the Amazon as 
a national security issue in rhetoric synonymous with military discourse—having been 
“discussed and proposed by the chief officers responsible for strategic planning in the 
military.”136  He issued the PDN as part of a defense policy that was “dominated by the 
single purpose of avoiding any hint of a conflict with the military in the interests of 
bolstering economic policy formation.”137  In support of Cardoso’s grand strategy, it 
served three crucial purposes: outlining modernization for the military, reinforcing 
military notions of sovereignty in the Amazon, and establishing the groundwork for a 
Ministry of Defense. 
From the military’s perspective, the PDN promised force modernization and 
reasserted its roles of defending sovereignty and national security.  Under previous 
presidents, the military had maintained its autonomy.  Fitch characterizes this kind of 
autonomy—a military that “choose its missions, define the threats to national security, 
[and] formulate its own defense policies”—as a failure of civil-military relations.138  
Before Cardoso’s PDN, the only institutionalized civilian control was Congress’ control 
of the military budget.  The austerity of Cardoso’s Plano Real worsened the shrinking 
military allotment.  Modernization that had been on hold during the military regime, and 
only modestly realized with the Calha Norte program under Sarney, was in danger of 
being cut.  FHC managed to define modernization as a national security interest in the 
PDN, thus ensuring the armed forces financial security.  The military’s “deterrent 
strategic posture” was crucial and had to be reinforced by “scientific and technological 
development [that allows] the Armed Forces to attain greater strategic autonomy and 
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better operational capabilities.”139  This modernization was implicitly tied with the armed 
forces’ reinvigorated responsibility for protecting national borders and sovereignty in the 
Amazon. 
The PDN also solved an “identity crisis” for the military that developed at the end 
of the Cold War.  The “restive military, concerned about two things: money (meaning 
both salary and the overall defense budget) and their future role” had the President’s 
backing for the first issue.140  FHC provided his guidance on the second when he named 
“protecting the Brazilian Amazon; and giv[ing] priority to development and 
reinvigoration of the strip of land along Brazil’s borders, especially in the northern and 
central western regions” as important defense directives.141  Cardoso also explicitly 
tasked the army with internal, public safety roles when the police were not sufficient—a 
task that was written into the 1988 constitution.142  However, the intermittent police 
actions authorized in the constitution did not have the same role-defining language as the 
PDN.  Instead, the National Security Doctrine stressed that a dedicated military presence 
in the Amazon was crucial to protecting the “territorial integrity and sovereignty” of 
Brazil.143  This document made national defense of the Amazon a priority.   
FHCs strategic style of governing is seen when he charges both the military and 
society with defense of the Amazon.  “The mission for defending the [Amazon] had been 
the exclusive responsibility of the Armed Forces” since the military regime.144  The 
National Defense Policy entrenched that role, but included societal support of the 
military’s efforts.  In concert with other landowners—of which the army is the largest 
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landholder in Amazônia145—and developers, the military embraced the charge to control 
the Amazon.146  In addition to this encouragement to develop, the PDN defined “armed 
groups in neighboring countries and international organized crime” as foci for the 
military.147  The army—as authorized by the PDN—continued to embrace defense of the 
Amazon as a primary responsibility.  However, society as a whole was also tasked with 
defending the nation’s economic resources, international prestige and “heritage and 
interests.”148  The army saw its charge as maintaining security of society-at-large that 
was trusted with populating and developing the region.   
The PDN reified Cardoso’s ability to strategically employ a key actor, the 
military, in support of his grand strategy of domestic development.  While large soybean 
farmers, “politically connected landowners” and industrial miners hold more political 
influence over state and local government policies in Amazônia than the military, the 
army is seen as a defender of these interests against international and non-state threats.149  
FHC sided with the military against international critics during the Roraima forest fires in 
1998.  While foreign actors criticized Brazil for its “inability to control the fires,” 
Cardoso reiterated his “confidence in the national armed forces’ ability to protect Brazil’s 
sovereignty.”150  The impact of these fires was two-fold.  Not only did Cardoso secure 
the military’s support for upcoming elections, but international criticism also fueled the 
Army’s traditional paranoia of global actors (NGOs).  As one military officer supposed, 
“Indians and rubber tappers, supported by foreign countries, will be able to claim 
autonomy and self-government inside the Amazon.”151  Cardoso allowed the continued 
animosity between the military and international actors because it did not directly impact 
his re-election or his grand strategy.   
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G. MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (1999) 
The creation of the Ministry of Defense was the second cornerstone of civil-
military reform that Cardoso sought as part of his grand strategy.  While it was a 
campaign promise during his first election, FHC was preoccupied with strategically 
balancing actors in the Amazon during his first two years in power.  After the PDN was 
passed, he spent the last half of his first term focusing on passage of the constitutional 
amendment for presidential re-election.152  An event that momentarily broke that focus 
was Argentina’s acceptance as the United States’ non-NATO ally.153  To maintain the 
international prestige aspect of his grand strategy, FHC used an August 1997 speech in 
Asuncíon, Bolivia to an audience of neighboring heads of state to announce the creation 
of a civilian Ministry of Defense.154  However, the passage of a re-election amendment 
was more important than immediate institution of a Ministry of Defense.  In order to 
fulfill his grand strategy, Cardoso needed a second term.  Therefore, the Ministry of 
Defense project was deferred until his second term.  
Of note, Cardoso had implemented the token position of a Chief of Staff of the 
Armed Forces (Emfa) in September 1995.  He appointed General Benedito Onofre 
Bezerra Leonel to the post as his liaison with the armed forces.155  Despite this position 
being filled by a military officer, the Emfa did not command troops and was therefore 
weaker than the service chiefs who were initially opposed to the creation of a Ministry of 
Defense (MD).156  No centralization of the services was actually pursued by the Emfa.  
Service chiefs remained in control of their branches and blocked any attempts to unify the 
services.  This position was further undermined when the SIVAM scandal broke out 
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shortly after its creation.  Even though Cardoso created the position as a forerunner to the 
Minister of Defense, it did not represent civilian control of the military—only 
reorganization of the military branches.  The position also lost its strategic importance 
when the SIVAM scandal broke and Cardoso was forced to deal with the military directly 
as a strategic actor. 
Creation of the Ministry of Defense was so protracted that it was not seen as a 
threat to established military prerogatives.  However, just as with the PDN, President 
Cardoso wanted to ensure absolute military support.  “In May 1998, a formal project to 
equip and modernize the armed forces was announced as the result of the projected 
creation of the new Ministry of Defense.”157  This modernization plan bought the 
military’s support because it was enacted before the actual creation of the Ministry and 
promised monetary support to each of the branches independently.  President Cardoso did 
not attempt reform of the military structure until shortly after his October 1998 re-
election.  Winning in the first round election, FHCs grand strategy was publicly 
reaffirmed.  Now that he was guaranteed another four years to achieve the economic 
growth and international prestige aspects of his grand strategy, FHC could turn his 
attention to his final measure of civilian control over the military.  On November 19, 
1998—a month after his re-election--Cardoso finally proposed a constitutional 
amendment to Congress that would change the “organization, preparation and 
employment of the Armed Forces” to create a Ministry of Defense—headed by a civilian 
minister—and remove the service chiefs from their cabinet positions.158 
After congressional approval, the former Senator Élcio Álvares was sworn in as 
Defense Minister on June 10, 1999.159  The Minister faced some resistance from the 
service chiefs, but “each of the services continu[ed] to develop their respective strategies” 
and was assuaged by presidential support for modernization.160  Cardoso received some 
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domestic criticism because “the Defense Minister would be but a decorative item, for 
power would, in fact, remain in the hands of the military.”161  However, the initial 
weakness of the Minister of Defense was purposeful to reduce friction with the military.  
The service commanders were replaced by the Minister of Defense on the president’s 
cabinet, but remained equal with the Minister with regard to military decisions.162  FHC 
had successfully implemented the keystone of civil-military relations without visibly 
impinging on the military’s perceived roles.  President Cardoso effectively balanced 
assertion of civilian control over the military with programs that appeased the armed 
forces.  The creation of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense did not cause military backlash 
because it was built with incremental steps that were punctuated by concessions to the 
military: salary increases and modernization plans.  To the international community, he 
was seen as a democratic consolidator. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso was the first Brazilian president since the transition 
to democracy to successfully apply a grand strategy that balanced complex domestic and 
international agendas.  He entered office with significant popularity that enabled him to 
pursue the economic reform aspects of his grand strategy.  He was a shrewd politician 
who knew the importance of both the domestic audience and international support when 
balancing civil-military reforms, domestic development and international conservation.  
Many of the actors affected by his grand strategy had strong interests in the Amazon.  
FHC successfully leveraged them against each other to achieve his goals for the duration 
of his two terms.   
Civil-military relation scholars evaluate Cardoso’s tenure in terms of military 
prerogatives he was able to diminish.  Environmental scholars look to the large 
international conservation programs he facilitated.  They also criticize his Decree 1775 as 
a set-back to indigenous rights.  Neither of these groups account for FHCs grand strategy 
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or the military’s influence on his Amazonian policies.  SIVAM and Decree 1775 both 
supported development, but were aligned with military interests to facilitate passage of 
the National Defense Policy.  He successfully leveraged a variety of actors in the 
Amazon to contribute to his grand strategy goals of economic growth and civil-military 
reforms.  FHCs sparse policies on conservation were combined with record economic 
growth to achieve his goal of increased international prestige.  Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso managed to successfully apply a grand strategy that balanced conservation, 
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IV. INDUSTRIOUS PRAGMATISM IN THE AMAZON UNDER 
PRESIDENT LULA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva was elected president in October 2002 from 
the Worker’s Party (PT).163  As a leftist, labor president, he was expected to diminish 
military programs in favor of social reforms.  However, he won the election based on a 
moderation of his social-change rhetoric and promised to uphold FHCs free market 
reforms.  He had popular support and inherited a relatively strong economy, which 
benefited from the commodity boom of the era.  This stability allowed him to approach 
the military and international community from a position of strength.  As a popular, 
progressive and pragmatic president, Lula realized military strength in the Amazon.  He 
used this key actor and its views on sovereignty and development to promote his 
sustainable development agenda in the region.  This chapter examines Lula’s rise to 
power and his early association with environmentalists through the Worker’s Party.  
Next, it evaluates his overall environmental policies through examination of sustainable 
development projects, environmental ministers, and indigenous reserve creation.  Finally, 
the chapter will evaluate the military’s impact on Lula’s grand strategy during his first 
and second terms. 
B. LULA’S GRAND STRATEGY 
Lula’s long history in the ideological and disciplined PT party shaped his views 
on development and conservation.  He was also an important leader when the PT party 
shifted to “vote-maximizing strategies” after the 1998 elections to increase the number of 
legislative members, governors and political representatives.164  Lula’s pragmatism, 
ability to win coalitional support and goal of social development are all aspects of his 
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grand strategy.  He maintained political power as opposition party leader under the 
military regime, through four elections, and during his re-election in 2006.  This political 
resiliency can be attributed to a consistent grand strategy that is focused on social reform 
and development.  While his support base and particular ideologies have expanded—and 
shifted—over time, Lula’s ability to pragmatically balance various domestic actors in 
pursuit of his central goals of social development strengthens his grand strategy. 
1. Lula’s Roots: The Worker’s Party 
The Worker’s Party (PT) was formed in 1980—during the military regime—and 
united labor with socialist thinkers to create “the only Brazilian party to have truly 
formed through societal mobilization rather than through elite politics.”165  Transition to 
democracy allowed the PT to officially participate in elections and they gained a small, 
but loyal following.  This disciplined party “espoused radical democracy, direct 
participation, and grassroots organization.”166  Lula, a former lathe operator and 
metalworker in São Paulo, rose to prominence as a union leader and a key figure in the 
PT.167  He was the perennial PT presidential candidate in 1989, 1994, 1998 and in 2002; 
and represented a stark alternative to FHC.  After his loss in the 1998 election, Lula and 
the PT realized that they needed to appeal to a broader audience and form political 
alliances to succeed in the 2002 election.  As Hunter notes, “the domestic effects of 
stabilization and global economic restructuring, which were recognized and digested only 
with time, led pragmatic leaders to set aside the PT’s historic project and replace social 
transformation with the pursuit of power.”168  For the Worker’s Party to gain popularity 
for the 2002 presidential election, it needed to temper its rhetoric, ally with other political 
parties, and appeal to grassroots organizations like environmentalists. 
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After 1998, the PT began to moderate itself to achieve mass appeal.  The party 
formed ties with various sectors of Brazilian society: including environmentalists and 
evangelicals.  The environmentalists were attracted by the PTs history of grassroots, 
social mobilization and growing popularity.  The 1992 Rio Conference united 
conservationists, but since then they had fragmented and lost political clout under the 
Franco and FHC administrations.  The PT party’s rise to power seemed to promise a 
break with neo-liberal development policies that harmed conservation efforts.  As a 
labor-based party, the Worker’s Party appealed to those environmentalists concerned 
with urban pollution problems more than those concerned with Amazon preservation.  
However, this minor differentiation did not affect the overall support that Brazilian 
conservationists gave the PT during the 2002 election campaign. 
2. Lula’s Election and Environmental Disappointment 
The Worker’s Party (PT) and Lula campaigned on a socially, environmentally 
responsible platform that was well-received by Brazil at large.  The PT managed to 
moderate its social rhetoric and even assured wealthy, conservative Brazilians that Lula 
would continue Cardoso’s successful neo-liberal economic policies.  He emphasized the 
importance of paying off the national debt and implementing social programs for the 
poor.169  Convincing media campaigns and promises for moderation won Lula the 
election in the second round of voting in October 2002.  He failed to sweep the populous, 
southern, and industrialized states of the south, but carried the poorer regions of the 
north.  Lula did not come into office with the same popularity as FHC, but immediately 
started with his socially-responsible development programs.  The creation of the Council 
of Social and Economic Development (CDES) in February 2003—one month after 
inauguration—“intended to give civil society, especially business, broader access to and 
participation in the policy-making process.”170  The council itself—still functioning as of 
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Lula’s second term—is an advisory board for the president on economic, development 
and social matters that is dominated by business leaders and southern industrialists.  This 
executive council was one of Lula’s first initiatives and focused on economic 
development; not an encouraging start for conservationists. 
From the outset of Lula’s first term, Lula’s bias for socialized development—
stemming from his party’s ideological roots—was clear.  He allowed road programs and 
development projects in the Amazon that were begun under Cardoso’s Avança Brasil 
project to continue.  This support of development infuriated conservationists.  “In 
October 2003, more than 500 NGOs and social movements sent Lula a letter criticizing 
his environmental policies in the strongest possible terms.”171  Most of these NGOs were 
Amazon-centric and were running up against the “divided soul of the Workers Party 
[whose] core of support—and much of its leadership—comes from the machine-shop 
floor.”172  The ideology and hopeful environmental promises of the election had been 
replaced with the pragmatism of running Brazil and strengthening the economy through 
development.  The diversity of environmental groups had contributed their wide support 
to his election, but did carry the political weight of other interest groups like business, 
land developers and the military.  He would need conservationist support in three years—
for the next election—but sacrificed their good opinion to the challenge of developing the 
economy and the country. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
From his initial election in 2002 until the present, Lula’s grand strategy towards 
the Amazon has been challenged twice.  His preference for a sustainable development 
policy in the Amazon is a reflection of his industrial roots.  At the same time, Lula is 
responsive to domestic and international conservation criticisms.  Domestically, he 
appoints renowned environmental activists as his Environmental Ministers.  These 
progressive ministers are staunch advocates for environmental conservation in the 
 
171 Hochstetler and Keck, 180-181. 
172 David Morton, "Looking at Lula: Brazil's Amazon Deforestation Worsens - Despite a 'Green' 
President," Environmental Magazine 16 (September/October 2005):15. 
 53
                                                
Amazon.  Responding to international conservation, Lula created indigenous reserves 
after the murder of a U.S. environmental activist.  A pending Supreme Court case 
involving the Raposa Serra do Sol keeps international attention on the Amazon during 
Lula’s second term.  While Lula’s environmental policies are often reactionary (creation 
of reserves after crisis), the appointment of environmental ministers and support for 
existing indigenous reserves proves that he successfully balances environmental actors 
against development and military interests in the Amazon.   
1. Priority to Development 
Lula, in support of his grand strategy of sustainable development, pursued 
infrastructure projects begun by FHC.  Road-building in Amazon is a primary project that 
“continu[es] on the potentially disastrous course set by the Cardoso administration’s 
ambitious Avança Brasil (Brazil Advances) program for the region and promis[es] to 
increase accessibility—and thus probable deforestation—of some of the most remote 
areas.”173  Hydro-electricity development is the other development that infuriates 
conservationists.  On the Madeira River, “two hydro-electric generating plants are to be 
built against fierce resistance from indigenous and environmental groups.  Mr Lula da 
Silva irritated Ms Silva [Environmental Minister] by commenting that Brazil’s economic 
development was being held up ‘for the sake of a few fish’.”174  Lula’s comment refers 
to the lengthy environmental permit process that the Ministry of Environment requires for 
development projects throughout Brazil.  The tension between Lula’s support of 
infrastructure projects in the Amazon and environmental concerns would cost him the 
support of two, notable environmental ministers. 
Agribusiness is the other area of development that conflicts with conservation.  
Lula supports increased farming because of both domestic and international pressures.  
MST lobbies for small parcels of arable land—often with illegal settlement and protests.  
Large landowners pressure Lula for more land to raise soybeans and cattle.  As 
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Greenpeace’s Brazil affiliate, Frank Guggenheim notes: “Lula is paying his bills with the 
export of soy and meat.  So he is absolutely ready to compromise on everything [relating 
to conservation].”175  Brazil’s soybean and energy exports are domestically-driven 
policies to diversify the economy and provide stability.  Since soybean exports bring in 
foreign currency, contribute to economic growth and provide Brazil with currency 
reserves, agribusiness is critical to continued growth.176  However, these large soybean 
and cattle plantations contribute to deforestation rates and conflict with conservationist 
ideas for the Amazon.  These agribusiness and infrastructure developments encroach on 
the region and are sources of tension between Lula’s development strategy and his 
environmental ministers. 
2. Environmental Ministers 
As discussed earlier, conservationists were glad when the PT won in 2002: 
“Lula’s Worker’s Party had been a powerful friend in Brazil’s congress and after his 
victory Lula appointed an internationally respected rainforest activist as his 
environmental minister.”177  He appointed Marina Silva, an activist from the Amazônia 
state of Acre, as his overall Minister of the Environment.  Mary Allegretti—appointed by 
FHC—kept her position as the secretary for the Amazon, working directly for Silva.178  
Rising from poverty in Acre, Silva formed early connections with the prominent 
environmental activist Chico Mendes and became a local Worker’s Party political 
candidate.179  This seemingly robust connection to conservation was challenged by 
ministerial politics—competition with the Ministry for Strategic Affairs—and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies that kept the Environmental Ministry from effectively carrying 
out conservation in the Amazon.  These difficulties and limited resources led the Mary 
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Allegretti, specifically charged with Amazon policy, to resign in 2004.  With her 
departure, the secretariat of the Amazon position was diminished and conservationists 
lost a strong environmental advocate.180  Allegretti’s frustrated departure foreshadowed 
Marina Silva’s—Lula’s Environmental Minister—resignation four years later. 
Economic development and social programs created tension, but not outright 
conflict, with Environmental Ministry programs during Lula’s first term.  This dynamic 
changed in 2008 when the Environmental Ministry lost its environmental oversight role 
over a development project in the Amazon.  The Ministry for Strategic Affairs was in 
charge of infrastructure development and pushed for construction of hydro-electric plants 
on the Madeira River to contribute to Brazil’s increasing power needs.  The project was 
being held up by the permits, studies and environmental impact assessments the 
Environmental Ministry required for all development projects.  This battle between the 
two ministries was resolved by Lula when he awarded responsibility for “sustainable 
development in the Amazon” to the Minister for Strategic Affairs, Robert Mangabeira 
Unger. 181  Marina Silva resigned as Environmental Minister later that evening.  By 
siding with development, Lula reinforced his strategic commitment to a developmental 
grand strategy.  Even though Silva was a noted activist, her departure did not impact any 
major domestic or international actors in the Amazon.  The bureaucratic tension between 
ministries mirrored the real struggle between conservation and development in the 
Amazon.  Two environmentalists resigned in the face of the administration’s 
development policies, but these resignations did not shift the balance of conservation and 
development in the Amazon.  Therefore, Lula’s grand strategy was largely unaffected.  
He continued the pattern of appointing noted activists as Environmental Minister with 
Silva’s replacement.  
Carlos Minc, founder of Brazil’s Green Party, took over Silva’s position in May 
2008.  He agrees with Minister Ungar’s ideas of “sustainable development” in the 
Amazon.  Unlike his predecessors, Minc is not a vocal opponent of road construction and 
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hydro-electric projects being completed in the Amazon.182  In December, he “announced 
a plan to reduce the rate of Amazon deforestation by half to 5,850 square kilometers per 
year by 2017.”183  This goal is ambitious and the mechanisms for enforcing it are not yet 
clear.  The close work between Ungar and Minc seems to suggest that Polícia Federal 
will be used to prevent illegal loggers and ranchers from expanding into the Amazon.  
However, land ownership in the Amazon is traditionally hard to prove—as seen with the 
myriad land disputes over indigenous lands.  Distinguishing between legal development 
and illegal deforestation is a lofty goal considering the overlapping jurisdictions—
federal, state and local—and various agencies that grant permits to harvest timber and 
raise cattle.  The diminished resources and political clout of the Environmental Ministry 
that drove Silva to resign is likely to limit Minc from effectively meeting his goal of 
diminishing deforestation. 
3. International Pressure 
Pressure to enforce environmental programs is not only the result of ardent 
domestic Environmental Ministers, but also from abroad.  Lula deals with the same 
international attention on the Amazon that every Brazilian president since Collor faced.  
International loans are still tied to conservation, the U.S. providing an average of eight 
million dollars a year for the Amazon Basin Conservation Initiative.  In March 2006, 
Lula balanced domestic business interests with these international restrictions and 
“signed the Public Forest Management Law, which allows companies access to 3% of the 
Amazon on the condition that they carry out sustainable operations.”184  This law, while 
technically requiring conservation, allows for greater development of the region.  
Combined with other development projects in the Amazon, this law establishes a clear 
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supporting economic interests.  Since the military supports developmental policies and 
incorporation of the Amazon with the rest of Brazil, Lula’s record seems to upset only the 
conservationists, both domestically and abroad. 
Creation of indigenous reserves arises two times during Lula’s administrations.  
During the first term, Dorothy Stang’s death was the catalyst for immediate action to 
create additional reserves.  In early 2005, Dorothy Stang—a foreign missionary and noted 
environmentalist—was killed by illegal loggers.  The international outcry resembled the 
uproar after Chico Mendes’ death in 1989.  A short two days after her death, Lula 
announced creation of five new indigenous reserves.185  This shift in environmental 
policy was an anomaly and the struggle “between environment and development 
continued within the administration” after the immediacy of Stang’s death passed.186  
Indigenous reserves were advocated as a polemic solution to deforestation.  Prior to 
Stang’s murder in Pára, “the Environmental Ministry had already prepared decrees that 
President Lula issued almost immediately, creating conservation units in Southern Pára 
alongside what was to become a major highway through the region, BR-163.”187 As 
Marina Silva notes, demarcation of these reserves was meant to “curb ‘violence and 
impunity associated with the illegal occupation of lands and deforestation’ in the 
Amazon.”188 The international community was appeased by Lula’s action, even though 
the additional decree did not change his fundamental strategy of development in the 
Amazon.   
Lula’s second term conservation confrontation coincided with a federal Supreme 
Court decision regarding the Raposa Serra do Sol (RSS) reserve.  This issue was a 
holdover from FHCs demarcation of the RSS in 1993 and his 1775 Decree.  Landowners 
immediately challenged the RSS demarcation under FHC and the case was referred to the 
Brazilian court system.  Fifteen years after the reserve was created, the Supreme Court 
 
185 Morton, 15. 
186 Hochstetler and Keck, 181. 
187 Ibid., 227. 
188 "Brazil Carves Out Two Vast Preserves in the Amazon Rain Forest," New York Times, February 
18, 2005, A section, East coast edition. 
 58
                                                
finally heard one of the many RSS contestation cases.  Lula, like FHC, officially declared 
the RSS as indigenous land (immediately following Stang’s murder).  However, Decree 
1775 was still in effect and allowed contestation of reserve boundaries.  Most of the land 
disputes between indigenous people and developers were resolved in state court, but a 
group of illegal rice farmers pressed their case farther.  Conflict between the indigenous 
Macuxi and these rice farmers escalated to violence and the Polícia Federal were called in 
to enforce the RSS borders.  The rice farmers took their case to court and pursued it to the 
highest levels.  While the majority of Supreme Court justices upheld the demarcation of 
RSS and the eviction of non-indigenous farmers from the area on December 10, 2008, the 
decision has yet to be finalized with the opinions of all the Supreme Court justices.189  
Eight of ten Supreme Court judges decided in favor of upholding the boundaries of RSS 
and sided with indigenous interests over developers.  The ruling, however, was not final 
because one of the judges requested additional time to review the case.190  The written 
decision of the RSS case has not been released, as of March 2009.  International interest 
remains high in this court case and sides with indigenous interests—pressuring the court 
to decide in favor of sovereign reserves.  The RSS reserve remains especially problematic 
for military because it lies along the border with Venezuela and invites violation of 
Brazilian sovereignty.  The court’s ruling is important for two reasons: it will determine 
whether the court system believes that Indians can have sovereign nations inside Brazil’s 
borders; and it will decide whether the military is allowed to enter the indigenous 
reserves to preserve national security.  
D. MILITARY AND THE AMAZON, 2002-2006 
Although Lula faced conservative and military resistance during the 2001 
presidential campaign, he understood that both groups were critical actors that could 
support his development grand strategy.  Unlike Collor’s reaction to military presence in 
the Amazon, Lula supported its development-oriented programs like SIVAM.  The 
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momentum that SIVAM gained under Cardoso was continued by Lula.  Recently, 
President Lula authorized the reinstatement of the Calha Norte program.  Developing the 
Amazon is integral to Lula’s grand strategy.  The military provides a continuing 
development presence in the region that Lula can incorporate into his larger 
developmental agenda.  The president has the option for using civilian development 
agents, but chooses the military to maintain orderly development in the Amazon. 
1. SIVAM 
Cardoso inaugurated the control facility at Manaus, but Lula’s first term saw the 
system finally operational.  The advanced system of radars, air traffic control stations, 
communication outposts and on-call aircraft was billed as a multipurpose system when it 
was conceived.  Now, SIVAM had to prove that it could coordinate civilian air traffic 
over the Amazon; prevent drug traffickers from flying with impunity; and provide early 
warning of deforestation (by both illegal logging and natural fires).  The first task was 
accomplished with alacrity, as the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) efficiently managed flight 
operations in the Amazon region.  FAB maintains dominance over civilian air traffic 
coordination beyond the Amazon, running the nation’s civilian air network.  The National 
Civilian Aviation Agency (ANAC) remains subordinate to FAB.191  This growing 
tension between FAB and ANAC for control of the civilian aviation sector is a larger 
issue that remains unresolved.  Despite this tension, the SIVAM system allowed 
successful coordination of civilian air traffic over the Amazon, which allowed FAB to 
differentiate authorized aircraft from those used by drug traffickers. 
The effectiveness of the aerial-focused SIVAM system has had unintended 
consequences for drug trafficking in the Amazon.  SIVAM detects unauthorized aircraft 
and FAB fighters intercept and ground the drug-laden planes.  Working in conjunction 
with the Polícia Federal (PF) and SIVAM, the army has shut down innumerable illegal 
airstrips.  By successfully denying drug traffickers the use of air strips in the Amazon, the 
military has deterred air-based drug trafficking.  However, the battle against drugs is not 
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so easily won and the trafficking has become water-bourne: “because of SIVAM, the 
traffickers have to avoid the radars.  That makes it more difficult for them to come by 
air.”192  This shift to rivers as a primary means of transporting drugs places the onus of 
controlling trafficking back with the army, and increasingly the navy.  “The Armed 
Forces want to step up their operations in the [Amazon] region more and more so as to 
become more familiar with it.  The Army is carrying out Operação Poraquê in the 
Amazon Region this week.”193  While SIVAM worked to deter airborne drug trafficking, 
it pushed the problem back on the army.  On a positive note, the PF and the army are 
cooperating to combat the drug problem.  The armed forces have police powers in the 
border zone and incorporate the under-manned PF on drug interdiction missions.  The 
unexpected dynamic between SIVAMs success and the shift to ground-based drug 
trafficking does not lessen the importance of maintaining SIVAM.  Indeed, the FAB must 
continue its mission over the Amazon to keep drug traffickers from returning to the skies. 
SIVAM has yet to prove that it can deter illegal deforestation or detect natural 
forest fires in enough time to adequately respond, however it will continue to receive 
funding and priority under President Lula because it fulfills other roles.  After proving a 
deterrent against drug trafficking, SIVAM was enlisted for scientific purposes and 
finding the best mining areas in the Amazon.  In the spirit of development, it “provide[s] 
basic geological information for exploration programs in the Amazon, an area known for 
its high mineral potential and lack of geologic information.”194  As a tool that monitors 
and maps the Amazon, SIVAM has the potential to track and deter deforestation, but the 
civilian institutional capacity is barely developed enough to effectively use it for 
conservation.  Aside from scientific endeavors—for both mining exploration and 
attempts at base-lining forest size—SIVAM fills the “the need left by the physical 
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absence of the forces along the entire border area.”195  Lula is dedicated to modernizing 
the military, but has neither the resources nor the inclination to increase the military’s 
size.  SIVAM serves as an early warning against potential invasions of the Amazon and 
allows the military to strategically respond to threats without being garrisoned along the 
entire border.  These roles ensure that SIVAM will remain an important part of the 
military’s plans to secure the Amazon. 
2. Calha Norte Reactivated 
The Cahla Norte project was begun by Sarney to guarantee military support.  
Collor quickly undermined the program by cutting all funding and support for military 
garrisons along the border.  Calha Norte is translated as “Northern Path” or “Northern 
Channel;” both of which have been used to describe a resurgence of troops along Brazil’s 
border during President Lula’s tenure.  As early as 2004, Colonel Alvaro Pinheiro briefly 
mentions the reactivation of the Calha Norte program as one of the premiere strategies in 
“securing” the Amazon:  
The Calha Norte Project is located to the north of the Solimões and 
Amazon rivers and covers 4,100 miles of border that separates Brazil from 
the Guyanas, Suriname, Venezuela and Colombia.  The Project involves a 
100 mile-wide strip along those borders, or an area of 700,000 square 
miles; this is equivalent to a quarter of Brazilian Amazon and about 15 
percent of Brazil’s territory.196   
Establishing a border zone that allows the military freedom to enforce sovereignty and 
security in the Amazon is reminiscent of the goals of during the military regime: a need 
to populate, develop and integrate the Amazon region in order to secure it.  This brief, yet 
detailed mention of the Calha Norte project was reinforced by Martins Filho.  He 
describes major army operations in the Amazon during Lula’s first two years in office: 
Operation Timbó (June 2003 and 2004) and Operation Ajuricaba III (November 
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2004).197  While these maneuvers may have been part of the military’s regular training, 
the timing of these massive operations coincides with Lula’s first years in office.  The 
military also asserted its presence in the Amazon in the first few months of FHCs 
presidency.  This pattern establishes that the military seeks to remind civilian leaders of 
their presence in the Amazon, even if the operations do not directly contest civilian 
control of the military.   
Unofficial support for increased military presence along the border began during 
Lula’s first term.  However, official mention of the Calha Norte program does not come 
until December 18, 2008 when Lula endorses the Strategic Defense Plan.  President Lula 
reassures the military that its projects in the Amazon would continue: “General Enzo, you 
can rest assured that the Army will continue building our highways, our bridges, because 
we have no interest in stopping any project.”198  He also played up the Navy’s 
importance as part of his Program to Accelerate Growth (PAC) in bringing humanitarian 
aide to river communities in the Amazon.199  Ten days after these comments, Lula signed 
the Strategic Defense Plan that mentions “promotion of actions emphasizing the presence 
of the State in the Amazonia, especially by strengthening the defense aspect of the North 
Channel Program.”200  The scarce official mention of this northern program is difficult to 
understand, given the broadly publicized military modernization efforts.  If this was a 
policy originated by Lula’s administration, it should receive as much press as the military 
budget increases.  Instead, the Calha Norte program seems to indicate a resurgence of the 
military’s role in quietly dictating Amazonian policy. 
The shift in Lula’s defense policy in the Amazon may be explained by the 
ascension of Defense Minister Nelson Jobim.  He was appointed in July 2007 after 
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Waldir Pires was forced to resign in the wake of an airplane crash.  Since FAB controls 
civil aviation in Brazil, Lula fired his Defense Minister to assuage public outrage.201  It is 
unclear whether Pires was a strong minister or conceded to military prerogatives in the 
Amazon.  However, Jobim’s intentions are clear.  He advocates the increased 
“participation of government, military and civilian agencies in the plan to enliven and 
develop the Amazon frontier strip, by using the strategy of maintaining a presence.”202  
He also explicitly authorizes the army to “exercise police powers in border zones.”203  As 
of February 2009, Lula has ratified both of these policies and fully supports his Minister 
of Defense.  Minister Jobim, in turn, completely supports the increased presence of the 
military in the Amazon.  While the term “Calha Norte” is seldom officially used by the 
Lula administration, the garrisoning of the border is evident. 
E. MILITARY AND THE AMAZON, 2006-PRESENT 
Lula’s military policies during his second administration represent original 
programs, not merely continuation of predecessors’ policies.  After he was re-elected and 
domestic social programs were in place, his attention shifted to both Brazil’s international 
prestige and the military.  The economy was growing, trade and development were 
diversified and new energy reserves were found off Brazil’s coast.  This stability allowed 
Lula to re-examine the role of the military and implement new policies.  Since orderly 
development in the Amazon is critical to fulfill Lula’s grand strategy, the military secured 
promises for modernization that would help them carry out that mandate.  President Lula 
also implemented a National Defense Strategy that bridged the gap between FHCs 
National Defense Policy and existing military defense strategies.  Lula’s defense strategy 
promised increased social support of the military and reaffirmed its importance in the 
Amazon. 
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1. Military Modernization 
Modernization of the military, in terms of new equipment, did not really begin 
until Lula’s second term.  Lula used most of his political capital during his first term to 
support social projects, enhance the economy, and deal with the MST landless 
movement.204  Although it is important that Lula allowed SIVAM to continue to 
completion, the program was pre-determined by budgets that were finalized under 
Cardoso.  The Calha Norte project marked border territory that would be the army’s 
responsibility, but did not provide explicit funds for modernization.  The fiscal austerity 
under FHC had precluded large-scale modernization.  By Lula’s second term, a 
commodity boom—in soybeans, ethanol and other products—permitted the increased 
defense spending necessary to establish Brazil as an emerging world power.  In 
December 2008, Lula spoke with the defense minister and the commanders of each 
service, assuring them that it was time to modernize: “Brazil became an economically 
more equitable nation, Brazil became a more [internationally] politically respected 
nation.  Our economy is growing and we are thinking of restructuring that which is the 
guarantor of our country: the Armed Forces.”205  These modernization plans were 
announced at the same time as a Strategic Defense Plan that reorganized the military was 
revealed.  Cardoso, a neo-liberal academic, won the military over with SIVAM plans 
even as the National Defense Plan was announced.  Lula, a labor worker, won the 
military over with modernization plans as he announced a Strategic Defense Plan. 
These modernization efforts constitute the largest state-investment since the 
military regime and total approximately six billion reais (Brazilian currency) between 
2008 and 2010, according to Defense minister Nelson Jobim.206  A large part of that, 
US$540 million will be used to build a Brazilian nuclear submarine and another nuclear 
power plant.207  “Far from being merely an aspiration of the military, the program for 
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reequipping the Armed Forces has broad support in the Lula government, Congress, and 
a well-oiled pro-domestic industry lobbying machine.” 208  While the modernization 
highlights the nuclear program, it also impacts the Amazon.  Funding will continue for 
SIVAM and an increased army presence along the Amazon border.  Interestingly, these 
modernization announcements came just months after the crisis between the 
Environmental Ministry and the Strategic Affairs Ministry was resolved in favor of 
sustainable development.  Since the military is a development actor, it is important to 
ensure they are capable of supporting development efforts with the latest equipment.  The 
fact that Roberto Unger, the Minister for Strategic Affairs, helped author Lula’s National 
Defense Strategy lends credence to the important connection between military and 
civilian development in the Amazon.  Even though the civilian development sector is 
growing under Lula, the military remains the strategic development actor in the Amazon. 
2. National Defense Strategy (December 2008) 
The Estratégia Nacional de Defesa (END), focused on setting military priorities, 
establishing a robust domestic military industry, outlining personnel issues for three 
services, and justifying compulsory service.  It took effect on December 18, 2008 and 
“fills the gap between the existing National Defense Policy (PDN), with which it is 
harmonized, and the Military Defense Strategy [Estratégia Militar de Defesa (EMD)], 
which must be revised to conform to the END.”209  The document was co-authored by 
the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, and Defense Minister 
Jobim.  According to the wording of these two documents, the PDN encouraged society 
to occupy and develop the Amazon; while the END places more emphasis on the military 
to control the region.  The navy would increase its presence in the Amazon River; the 
army would position its strategic reserves in the center of the country so they could 
deploy in any direction; and the FAB would provide early warning for the army and 
 
208 Angela Pimenta, "The Military Goes Shopping," trans. Open Source Center, São Paulo Exame, 
August 22, 2008. 
209 Luiz Eduardo Rocha Paiva, "Evaluating the National Defense Strategy," trans. Open Source 
Center, O Estado de São Paulo, February 6, 2009. 
 66
                                                
maintain its vigilance over the Amazon with SIVAM.210  Each service must devote itself 
to “the defense of Amazônia [that] calls for a sustainable development undertaking and 
draws on the triad of monitoring / control, mobility, and presence.”211  If the Calha Norte 
programs has actually been resurrected, it would align perfectly with the goals of Lula’s 
Strategic Plan.   
Sovereignty and challenges to Brazil’s interest in the Amazon are also specifically 
addressed using language that reinforces military beliefs.  Resistance against external 
meddling is now spelled out as part of the national defense strategy:  
Brazil will be vigilant in the unconditional reaffirmation of its sovereignty 
over Brazil's Amazônia.  Through implementing development and defense 
activities, it will repudiate any attempt to oversight its decisions with 
respect to the preservation, development, and defense of the Amazônia.  It 
will not allow organizations or individuals to serve as instruments for 
foreign - political or economic - interests that may wish to infringe upon 
Brazilian sovereignty.  Brazil is the one that watches over its Amazonia to 
serve mankind and itself.212 
Each branch is charged with resisting foreign intervention in its own way.  The navy will 
establish a “multi-use naval base, comparable to the Naval Base of Rio de Janeiro in 
terms of capacity and capability” at the mouth of the Amazon.213  The army will “station 
along the borders, [and] will act as advance vigilance and deterrence detachments.”214  
The FAB will continue to run SIVAM—incorporating more civilians—so that it can also 
develop new space technologies.215  Based on the END, the military is responsible for 
repelling foreign incursions into the Amazon.  Using sustainable development as “an 
instrument for national defense,” the military will be ready to contend with any force that 
challenges the “unconditional Brazilian sovereignty…under the pretext of advancing the 
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presumed interests of humanity.”216  The Strategic Plan aligns the military to defend the 
Amazon against internationalism, an ingrained military fear since Collor’s 
administration. 
The language concerning defense of the Amazon is very strong in Lula’s Strategic 
Plan.  It compliments the two other strong purposes of the document: to reinforce 
modernization intentions and explain personnel restructuring for all services.  The navy’s 
modernization, as outlined in the Strategic Plan, is heavily invested in a nuclear 
submarine.  This ambition required a new round of talks between Brazil and Argentina to 
reassure compliance with their joint non-proliferation treaty.217  The FAB’s expansion 
into space technology will no doubt provoke reactions from northern nations.  The army’s 
continually increasing presence in the Amazon will likely increase tension between 
development agents and conservationists.  Despite the potential for foreign (and 
domestic) disagreement with the END, it has the full backing of the President and the 
Ministry of Defense. 
3. Military Maintains the Hard-line on Indigenous Reserves 
Since it is accepted that “the problem in the Amazon has never been the lack of 
laws, but the lack of resources to enforce them,” the military—as an enforcing agent and 
directly impacted by reserve creation—becomes important when discussing indigenous 
reserves.218  Indigenous reserves remain a salient threat to the military’s view of the 
Amazon.  Representing both enclaves for international interests and an impediment to 
progressive development, indigenous reserves are contrary to the military’s ideas of 
sovereignty.  In 2004, Pinheiro voiced a pervasive military view: “Brazil can’t renounce 
its obligation and right to develop those natural resources.  Foreign ‘tutelage’ or political 
impositions [in the form of indigenous reserves] are absolutely unacceptable.”219  The 
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same fear is expressed by former commander of the Army General Staff School, Luiz 
Eduardo Rocha Paiva as recently as February 2009—in response to the pending Supreme 
Court ruling on indigenous reserves: “there is a tacit long-range international strategy for 
applying successive measures to impose shared sovereignty in the Amazon Region.”220  
To protect against this threat of foreign subversion and involvement in the indigenous 
reserves, the army feels it must occupy the Amazon and promote “preservation, 
sustainable development, and integration of the native population and the region into the 
country.”221  These views were supported by FHC because the National Defense Plan 
(PDN) called for society to occupy the Amazon and practice sustainable development.  
Lula’s END reinforces these views of protecting the Amazon against intrusion.   
Fundamentally, the military still questions the validity of reserves and the 
sovereignty of indigenous peoples.  International pressure forces the federal government 
to designate reserve areas that it would not otherwise create.  These “Trojan horses” 
challenge Brazilian sovereignty, create pockets of land that are technically off-limits to 
the military, and elevate Indians over other Brazilians.222  However, the Brazilian public 
is led to believe that there is genuine cooperation between indigenous people and the 
armed forces against the illegal miners and loggers.223  Demarcation of indigenous 
reserves legally prohibits any non-indigenous people from violating these areas.  
However, this legal restriction directly conflicts with the military’s charge to ensure 
security in the Amazon.  Therefore, the military justifies its incursions into reserves as 
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This view is so pervasive that the latest Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim asserts: 
There is no Indian territory in Brazil.  What we have in Brazil is land 
belonging to the Union but assigned to Indian usufruct.  And it is 
important that the Federal Supreme Court, now that it is deciding the 
Raposa-Serra do Sol case, is upholding the demarcation made by the 
government…even the president of the republic has issued a decree saying 
that we are going to establish border posts and military organizations on 
all the Indian lands precisely to prevent anything that is not Indian—not 
native.  No Indian wants to stop being Brazilian.224 
These strong, public statements put inordinate pressure on the Supreme Court for 
ruling against the Macuxi in the RSS case.  The fact that one judge is delaying the official 
ruling to review evidence—despite eight other judges ruling in favor of the Macuxi—
could be a result of these overt military contentions.  The military is opposed to the RSS 
case because they are opposed to anything that detracts from Brazilian sovereignty as 
they see it.  Large tracts of indigenous land along the border potentially facilitate drug 
trafficking, illegal logging, mining and farming that all threaten national security and 
stability.  The military was charged by the PDN formulated under President Cardoso to 
protect all Brazilian citizens and all Brazilian property.  As Lula’s latest endeavor to 
rectify the military’s perceived role in the Amazon with official policy, he approved the 
National Defense Strategy in December 2008.  Instead of resolving how indigenous 
reserves should be protected, it outlined a restructuring of the military. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Although Lula came to the presidency with popular support and a relatively stable 
economy, he did not attempt to dislodge the military from the Amazon.  In fact, he 
supported its presence and codified its developmental role in his 2008 National Defense 
Strategy.  The military’s control in the Amazon provides security that allows Lula to 
pursue his socially-based, sustainable development strategy.  It also serves as a resident 
development actor that augments civilian developers: building roads, assisting with 
hydro-electric projects and irrigation systems.  The flood of unorganized, often illegal, 
Brazilian citizens surging into the Amazon to develop it is countered by the military.  The 
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inability of state institutions and the Polícia Federal to adequately control the influx of 
legal and illegal developers forces the federal government to depend on the military.  
Lula recognizes that the existing military presence is politically easier to bolster than 
replace with civilian institutions that keep the peace and promote development.  As a 
pragmatic politician, he is taking advantage of a capable, resourceful, organized force 
that supports his development agenda for the Amazon. 
Lula’s commitment to development arises from the need to support economic 
growth and to contribute to Brazil’s international ascendancy.  The military is critical 
actor in carrying out Lula’s grand strategy in the Amazon.  With the completion and 
relative success of SIVAM, Lula is shifting the FAB’s focus to space technology and 
domestic aircraft development.  The navy is not only increasing its presence along the 
Amazonas River, but it is also developing domestic nuclear submarine technology.  The 
army’s primacy in the Amazon persists as fighting drug trafficking and guaranteeing 
Brazilian sovereignty.  Lula is using two of the services to develop Brazil’s international 
prestige and capability.  He uses the army’s self-defined mission of defending the 
Amazon to maintain orderly development in the region.  Lula is following the same trend 
as FHC: issuing national defense policies that reinforce the military’s role in the Amazon 
while remaining vague about the military’s presence on indigenous lands.  As long as the 
military continues to contribute to Lula’s grand strategy, he will use them as an important 
actor in Amazônia.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. BRAZILIAN CONSIDERATIONS 
The days of military rule and unstable democracy are over in Brazil.  The last two 
presidents have been strong-willed, pragmatic leaders who come to office with specific 
agendas and grand strategies to fulfill those plans.  Unlike past presidents who solely 
react to crisis, these strategic chief executives balance domestic and international actors 
to achieve their interests.  The Amazon, as a vast and largely untapped resource, is a 
crucial arena in which Brazilian presidential grand strategies are tested.  Domestic 
development, conservation (domestic and internationally-driven), and security are three 
areas of concern in Amazônia that must be addressed when formulating presidential 
policies.  The future for each of these three areas depends on how they amplify the grand 
strategies of future Brazilian presidents. 
1. Conservation 
The domestic conservation movement represents such a diversified group that it 
does not regularly influence policy.  This motley crew of individual organizations is 
focused on environmental issues ranging from urban pollution to forest protection to 
indigenous rights.  A broad coalition is only catalyzed when a major event, like a notable 
murder or international summit, happens.  Otherwise, it becomes such a fragmented and 
internally-competitive group that it cannot hope to influence Brazilian development 
policy in the Amazon.  This weak domestic political actor can be strengthened by 
international support, but attempts to gain external support can be seen as direct threats to 
sovereignty by the military.  It should be noted that traditional ideas of development have 
been somewhat moderated into “sustainable development” in the Brazilian lexicon.  
However, this new term does not guarantee that its results are environmentally-friendly 
or supported by conservationists. 
Despite notable activists being named as Environmental Ministers under several 
presidents—Lutzenberger, Allegretti, Silva, and Minc—this office carries less political 
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clout than either the Ministry of Strategic Affairs (Internal Development) or the Defense 
Ministry.  In fact, the Strategic Affairs Minister and Defense Minister cooperated to 
produce the National Defense Strategy (END) under President Lula.  The lack of 
resources and political weakness of environmental ministers means that Amazonian 
conservationists must continue to rely on international pressure to moderate development.  
This external help is becoming more difficult as Brazil’s importance in the international 
community increases and other nations are less likely to challenge its domestic policies.  
Brazilian conservationists must find new ways to tap into international conservation 
groups and resources that minimize confrontation with domestic development and 
security concerns. 
2. Development 
Development rhetoric has slowly changed so that projects now constitute 
“sustainable development.”  This change in phrase does not stop road construction, 
logging and farming (both legal and illegal). Since the original Forest Code in 1934, 
preservation has always been mentioned in conjunction with development.  Farmers, 
ranchers and landowners must keep a certain percentage of forest on their land but are 
allowed to develop the remainder.  This percentage has varied over time, but the presence 
of developers has only grown.  FHC's Decree 1775 and Lula's "Public Forest 
Management Law” both allow development on preserved forest.  The preference for 
development over conservation is natural for Brazil as its economy grows and its 
population expands.  Global trade places more value on soybeans, timber and cattle than 
on the preservation of the Amazon. As long as it is cheaper to develop agribusiness in 
northern Brazil than it is to develop industry in the highly populated south, the Amazon 
will continue to be threatened.   
Strategic presidents realize that controlled development leads to economic growth 
and increased international importance.  Despite having diverse personal backgrounds, 
both FHC and Lula advocate development in the Amazon.  The mineral wealth in the 
region contributes to Brazil’s domestic industry.  Increasing numbers of farms and 
agribusiness in the southern Amazon make Brazil an international supplier of soybeans.  
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In both cases, development leads to increased economic growth: a critical factor for every 
president.  Brazil’s stability during the recent global recession proves that its international 
importance is growing, largely based on its diverse development policies.  As Brazil 
continues to grow economically, it will depend on increased development in the Amazon.  
A major contributor to development in this region is the military. 
3. Military 
With the lack of conventional threats, the military looks to define its role in 
defending Brazil.  It has found new importance in defending the sovereignty and national 
borders in the Amazon.  According to the military’s definition of sovereignty, it sees both 
the international community and indigenous reserves as dangerous.  The international 
community—supporting NGOs and native populations—is seen as a threat because they 
usurp Brazilian land that could be developed.  Indigenous peoples are also problematic 
for the military because they should want to be Brazilian, not their own sovereign people.  
They should not create unrest and security problems in the middle of the Amazon when 
fights with illegal loggers, miners, drug traffickers and landless farmers erupt.  In the 
army’s view, the federal government has been pressured by the international community 
to create these reserves against its better judgment.  The language in FHC's PDN and 
Lula's END affirms this view by elevating the military as the supreme entity in the 
Amazon.  Any group that wants to preclude development, violate sovereignty or threaten 
national security will be dealt with by the army in Amazônia. 
The military is also a built-in developer that can maintain the peace in this 
expanding region.  The flood of Brazilians into the Amazon—including miners, loggers, 
ranchers, and landless peasants—creates a dangerous frontier atmosphere rife with 
instability.  The federal police do not have the resources to control the violence that 
results from land disputes and crime in the Amazon.  The military does have the 
resources.  It also has the institutional capacity to conduct large-scale development like 
highway construction.  Brazil’s development depends on securing its resources, so the 
military’s role is inextricably linked with development in the Amazon.  Hypothetically, if 
the military were not involved in the Amazon, development of the region would devolve 
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into a race for resources between legal and illegal development forces.  Massive 
insecurity would erupt and the government would not benefit from resources ransacked 
from the area.  The military’s traditional security role in the region prevents this kind of 
rampant, uncontrollable development from happening.  Political leaders continue to 
empower the military in the Amazon because it is the only truly powerful, coordinated 
state actor in the region. 
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
Brazil is a nation “where democratic institutions are still consolidating, 
experience with citizenship is limited, and rights are poorly secured.”225  However, the 
recent political literature has focused on social inequality and the quality of democracy in 
Brazil, not civilian control of the military.  It is clear that civilian control of the military 
exists through a civilian Ministry of Defense, an over-arching National Defense Plan 
(PDN) and a military-centric National Defense Strategy (END).  However, these 
instruments of civilian control mask the fact that the military has maintained the same 
relative missions in the Amazon that it had during the military regime.  The END even 
grants the military supremacy in Amazônia to integrate indigenous peoples, oversee 
civilian institutions and guard against international interference.226  Civilian defense 
ministers in the last thirteen years have consistently supported military dominance in the 
Amazon, at the expense of conservation efforts.  The military remains the dominant actor 
in civil-military relations as long as it can convince civilian leaders that its self-prescribed 
missions are immutable and should be supported, not challenged. 
The military maintains this autonomy largely because of its indispensable 
domestic role.  As a whole, “the Brazilian Armed Forces never forg[o]t its permanent 
mission ‘to sew the seam of national unit[y],’ directly participating in the country’s 
development efforts and, through the soldier’s presence in all regions, maintaining (sic) 
 
225 Lourdes Sola, "Politics, Markets, and Society in Lula's Brazil," Journal of Democracy 19 (April 
2008): 33. 
226 Nelson Jobim interview and the "Brazilian National Defense Strategy date."  
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national cohesion, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”227  The air force ties the country 
with control of Brazil’s civil aviation.  In the Amazon, they support that national aerial 
integration with SIVAM.  The navy protects the coastline and newly-found Atlantic gas 
reserves.  They also have a significant humanitarian and security role along Amazonian 
waterways.  The army—the dominant armed force in the Amazon—maintains the 
national border against drug traffickers, foreign guerillas and other illegal developers.  
Imbued with police powers along the border, the army takes over the domestic security 
function that Polícia Federal and state police should retain.  It also builds highways and 
hydro-projects that facilitate further development in the Amazon.  Currently, all of these 
functions can only be accomplished by the institutionalized military.  Instead of 
developing civilian institutions to take over some of these duties, presidents find it easier 
to rely on the military.   
Jorge Zaverucha asserts that the state of civil-military relations remains tenuous in 
Brazil.  As long as strategic presidents rely on the military to carry out policy in the 
Amazon, civil-military relations remain incomplete in Brazil. However, since Cardoso’s 
administration, it is difficult to measure the fragility of civilian control through formal, 
political prerogatives.  The military has relinquished many of its political privileges by 
accepting the civilian Defense Ministry and the national security policies.  No longer 
does it openly threaten the legislative process.  Instead, the military’s power has shifted to 
its developmental role in the Amazon and the defense industry (for the air force and 
navy).  As the federal government gives more land, influence and responsibility in 
Amazônia to the military, the harder it will be for conservationist or even civilian 
developers to affect direct change in the Amazon.  The military’s primacy in the region 
also blocks civilian institutions—like domestic NGOs, state police and even government 
development agencies—from building capacity in the Amazon.  With civilian institutions 
interminably subordinate to military presence, it demonstrates that civilian policymakers 
have not completely asserted civilian control over the military. 
 
227 Pinheiro, 9. 
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C. U.S. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Brazil is a prime example of a state that remains economically strong despite 
recent downturn in the world economy.  The diversity of its exports, its growing energy 
sector (newly discovered Atlantic gas fields), and its policy of domestic industrial 
development all contribute to its growth.  While it is still listed as a developing nation, 
Brazil is becoming an important world leader.  To maintain the economic and 
international ascendancy, Brazil is securing its resources.  FHC and Lula both used the 
military to defend its resources. Garrisoning troops and building roads to secure the 
Amazon’s development against drug traffickers, indigenous people, and international 
meddlers means that the forest is sacrificed to economic growth.  As a result of this 
economic growth, Brazil is re-emerging as formidable regional leader. 
U.S.-Brazil relations will become increasingly important in the coming years as 
the two dominant countries in the Western Hemisphere. The U.S. cannot afford to make 
uninformed policies towards Brazil, especially environmental policies towards the 
Amazon.  It is important for U.S. policy-makers to understand the strategic goals of 
Brazilian presidents and to consider the complex relationships between conservation, 
development and security in the Amazon.  This administration has taken its first steps to 
recognize these dynamics.  Admiral Mullen—the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
and senior ranking U.S. military member—recently traveled to the Amazon to prove that 
America recognizes various Brazilian concerns including security for the region.  He 
traveled to Manaus, Brazil—in the heart of the Amazon—to gain understanding of 
Brazil’s “military capabilities and the challenges of defending areas such as the Amazon 
Basin.”228  This visit was an important step in realizing the impact of U.S. policies on 
conservation and civil-military relations in Brazil.  Instead of being seen as a threatening 
outsider that covets the Amazon, it is crucial—for continued U.S.-Brazil relations—for 
America to engage with Brazil’s pragmatic presidents and understand the multiple fronts 
of conservation, sustainable development and security in the Amazon. 
 
228 Jim Garamone, "Mullen Notes Importance of U.S. Relationship With Brazil," American Forces 
Press Service, March 3, 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil (accessed March 3, 2009). 
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